INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO INTERVENE

BY AMICUS CURIAE

in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel)

  1. The basis for this application is that it is in the interests of justice for the Court to consider the following novel submission: that the UN response to the 2011 situation in Libya is a precedent for the adoption of an analogous response to the current situation in Gaza.

May it Please the Court

Precedential effect of the UN response to the 2011 situation in Libya  

  • The situation in Libya in early 2011 has strong parallels with the situation in southern Palestine and particularly the Gaza region ‘Gaza’ today. In both the triggering event was an insurrectional secessionist movement’s clash with the overarching polity. In both cases this movement was met with the force of the existing state, intent on crushing the insurrection and preventing any such succession.  In regard to Libya, high ranking members of the Secretariat, including both the then and current Secretary-Generals, swiftly came to the conclusion that the response of the State to the insurrection, amounted to genocide. Moreover, such was the peril and urgency, that they sponsored an overwhelming military invasion, which in a month from the initial social unrest began bombing the Libyan state forces into oblivion. The combined might of NATO was pitted against a nation of some 4 million people, which within hours of the initial assault had no effective air defence. Bombers were deployed from as far away as Scotland, to lay waste to Tripoli, its capital city. To draw out the parallels and precedential authority of the UN Libyan policy and actions which bear on the current situation in Gaza, issues are discussed under the following headings:
  • The general situation in Libya in 2011;
  • The factual basis for the actions taken by UN organisations, together with a comparison with the factual basis for the remedy sought here;
  • The UN process by which the threat of genocide was eradicated in Libya;
  • The denial of a right to be heard, when genocide in issue;
  • Application of fundamental principles to this proceeding.

The general situation in Libya in 2011

  • While the actual situation in Libya in 2011 is a matter of dispute, for the purpose of this submission the situation is taken to be that adopted by the UN.  The following chronology sets out the main events:

December 17, 2010: Mohamed Bouazizi’s Self-Immolation.

December 18, 2010 – January 4, 2011: Tunisian Protests Escalate. Although police kill ~300 protesters, UN involvement is minimal. UN human rights bodies, including Mr. Guterres’ OHCHR, issued no formal statements. UNHCR noted early refugee movements, but took no public action.

February 15–16, 2011: Libyan Protests begin. UN Involvement almost immediately. OHCHR and UNHCR commence monitoring. Mr. Guterres’ UNHCR deploys staff to Tunisia’s Ras Jdir border with Libya by February 21.[1]

February 21, 2011:  Libyan UN deputy representative Ibrahim Dabbashi holds UN press conference, accusing Colonel Gadaffi of “genocide” and calling for a no-fly zone.[2]

February 22–24, 2011: OCHA claims there have been 300–400 deaths in Benghazi and that refugee numbers reach 10,000–20,000 at Tunisia/Egypt borders.[3]  

OHCHR: Navi Pillay condemns “indiscriminate shootings” on February 18, citing UN staff and activist reports. On February 23, she calls for an international inquiry, estimating 600–2,000 deaths.[4]

UNHCR: Mr. Guterres directs border operations, reporting attacks on civilians/migrants and informing HRC briefings. OCHA reports displacement and casualties, supporting OHCHR’s HRC submissions.

February 24 2011 Mr. Guterres urges humanitarian access. UNHCR and OCHA scale up border operations, reporting to the HRC and Security Council.[5]

February 25, 2011: HRC convenes its 15th Special Session, adopting Resolution S-15/1 to establish the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, citing “gross and systematic” violations.[6]

February 26, 2011: Ban Ki-moon and Navi Pillay brief the Security Council, citing UN field staff and UNHCR reports. UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1970, imposing sanctions on the Libyan government, referring Libya to the ICC and mandating co-operation with UN bodies.[7]

March 1–10, 2011: Libyan Conflict escalates. UNHCR claims refugees amount to 30,000+ by March 10.

March 5 2011 Libyan government appointed Ali Abdussalam Treki[8] as its new Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as communicated to Secretary-General Moon.[9] It is unknown when the Secretary-General forwarded this notification to the Credentials Committee or when the Committee decided to stall the application. On an unknown date the USA refused Mr. Treki a visa to travel to the UN.

March 12 2011 the Arab League calls for a no-fly zone.

March 17 2011: UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizes a no-fly zone and “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, effectively greenlighting military intervention.[10]

March 19 2011: NATO bombing campaign begins.

10 April 2011: Tripoli Meeting of UN special envoy Al Khatib and African Union delegation with Libyan government. Agreement to ceasefire and political dialogue reached, but ceasefire blocked by NATO and Arab League.[11]

  • The first thing to be noted about the above chronology is the alacrity with which the UN acted, when it came to Libya. The time from civil unrest breaking out in Libya, until the bombing began, was 31-32 days. The second thing to be noted is the number of casualties the UN thought warranted overwhelming military intervention.

The factual basis for the actions taken by the UN Secretariat, together with a comparison with the evidential basis for the remedy sought here

  • As set out above, as a basis for military intervention OCHA alleged 300–400 deaths in Benghazi. OHCHR alleged 600–2,000 deaths overall. As can be seen by the spread of the latter claim, this was just a guess.
  • In regard to the Gaza conflict, this submission relies on the evidential material provided by others supporting the Application. It is uncontestable that the civilian death toll in Gaza dwarfs the Libyan numbers. Mr. Guterres claimed 30,000+ Libyans were displaced, at the time he sponsored overwhelming military intervention. The current number of Gazan refugees is estimated to be 1,900,000.
  • The specific allegations levelled against the Libyan government are set out in A/HRC/17/44, A/HRC/19/68. The ‘evidential’ foundation of these allegations, is purportedly set out in A/HRC/19/68/Add.1, but this prime document is not listed in the relevant UN documentation list and there appear to be no accessible links to it. Accordingly, no scrutiny of any kind could be undertaken. Moreover, as UN reports generally lack transparency and provide no names of those making allegations, there are no depositions on oath and still less cross-examination. This is not evidence that could be accepted by any Court.  Taking the UN claims at face value there are the following allegations.

Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” A/HRC/17/44, June 1, 2011.

  •  This report related that the: “Commission has established that the Libyan authorities engaged in excessive use of force against demonstrators in February 2011, particularly in Benghazi, Al-Bayda, Derna, and Tripoli. Security forces fired live ammunition at unarmed protesters, resulting in numerous deaths and injuries. These actions constitute violations of the right to life under Article 6 of the ICCPR and may amount to crimes against humanity due to their widespread and systematic nature. (para. 58) The Commission received credible reports of torture and ill-treatment of detainees by security forces, including at Abu Salim prison. Detainees were subjected to beatings, electric shocks, and prolonged solitary confinement. Enforced disappearances were reported, with individuals detained without trace, particularly in Tripoli and Misrata.” (para. 72) Government forces conducted indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas, including shelling of residential neighborhoods in Misrata with mortars and Grad rockets. These attacks caused significant civilian casualties and damaged civilian infrastructure, violating international humanitarian law.” (para. 89)
  • The Commission minimized reports of abuses by anti-Government forces, stating that, “these incidents appear less systematic than Government violations.” (para. 102) It is noted that while the secessionist insurrectionaries are described as “anti-Government forces”, the government forces are described as the “Gadaffi regime”. It appears that the report writers had no sense on congruity.
  1. The above claims provide no numbers and no dates. Taking the first instance above, the mostly peaceful protesters claim, it is noted that this armed insurrection raged across Libya and was only stopped at the gates of Tripoli, by Turkish forces. Torture and ill-treatment of detainees is a hideous practice, but there is no mention of starvation as a torture, as is commonly employed against Gazan detainees and there are few worse examples of mass torture and ill-treatment than that carried out by the current Israeli regime.
  1. In regard to the “shelling of residential neighborhoods in Misrata”, without dates or recourse to A/HRC/19/68/Add.1 it cannot be known if it was indeed “indiscriminate” but in any event it must pale into insignificance when compared with the nuclear level devastation of Gaza and the civilian casualties caused by that blanket bombardment.

Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya,” A/HRC/19/68, March 2, 2012

  1. This report does give numbers and specific atrocities, including the claim that, “In Benghazi, security forces killed unarmed protesters systematically, with snipers targeting individuals.” (para. 29) The report also states: “In Al Qalaa, Government forces used a boy scouts’ camp as a detention site, where detainees were tortured and executed. A mass grave with 34 blindfolded bodies was uncovered, indicating extrajudicial killings.” (para. 45) The report also refers to the Yarmuk Massacre: “At the Yarmuk detention facility in Tripoli, Khamis Brigade forces killed approximately 124 detainees in August 2011 by throwing grenades into a warehouse and firing on survivors. This act constitutes a war crime.” (para. 51) While the sniping allegation appears to relate to the first phase of the conflict, the only date given is August 2011, months after the Libyan government’s offer of a ceasefire was rejected.
  1. The report also noted: “Thuwar (anti-Gaddafi forces) committed serious violations, including war crimes. In Sirte, Misrata militias executed 53 Gaddafi supporters in October 2011, with evidence of shootings after capture.” (para. 62) “The Commission documented widespread arbitrary arrests by thuwar, particularly of sub-Saharan Africans and dark-skinned Libyans suspected of being mercenaries. Detainees faced torture, including beatings and electric shocks, in makeshift detention centers.” (para. 67)
  1. While the report charged the Libyan government with “Crimes Against Humanity” along with war crimes, the insurrectionists were only charged with “war crimes and breaches of international human rights law”. As both are alleged to have conducted mass execution of prisoners, it appears that the distinction was the allegation that the Libyan government had engaged in “widespread and systematic attack on civilians” and “killed unarmed protesters systematically, with snipers targeting individuals”. Although the targeting of “sub-Saharan Africans and dark-skinned Libyans” would appear to fall within the systematic.  It then appears that it was State- orchestrated systematic acts of violence, rather than individual acts of brutality, which occasioned the sponsoring of overwhelming military intervention. Systematic State level acts of violence directed by the Israeli State against civilians are extensively chronicled in the evidence before the Court.

Conclusion as to comparative crimes against humanity: Libya 2011/Palestine today

  1. Horrible as the acts by the Libyan government forces might have been, comparing Libya with Gaza, there is simply no comparison, either in deaths or displacement. As documented by the evidence placed before the Court, the crimes being committed by the state of Israel are orders of magnitude greater than those committed in Libya. If the Libyan situation warranted expedited destruction of the Libyan government, a fortiori the Gazan situation warrants expedited destruction of the Israeli government.

The UN process by which the threat of genocide was eradicated in Libya

Introduction

  1. The UN Secretary-General Moon, other high-ranking members of the Secretariat and particularly the current UN Secretary-General Guterres, played a key role in the facilitation of military intervention in Libya, by allegations of genocide, crimes against humanity and  referral to the ICC.
  1. Within a month of the issue of genocide in Libya being raised, the UN passed Resolution 1973, which provided for overwhelming military force, to immediately crush the Libyan government and so prevent acts of genocide. In this component, the process by which this was expeditiously effected is set out. While the means adopted may not have been fair or even lawful, no criticism is intended here, but rather that where the threat of genocide is in issue, robust and decisive steps must be taken. These emergency measures, taken by the UN to prevent genocide in Libya, constitute a legal precedent for similar steps to be taken here. Most importantly, by the time Resolution 1973 was put before the General Assembly, it was apparent that there no proof of acts of genocide and it was risk of genocide that validated the use of overwhelming military force to remove a government, that may have committed acts of genocide or might do so in the future.

Mr. Guterres’ UNHCR

  1. In relation to civil deaths in Tunisia, Mr. Guterres took no public action, but within 6 days of the initial Libyan protests Mr. Guterres deployed staff to Tunisia’s Ras Jdir border with Libya. By February 22, 2011, UNHCR reported 5,000 refugees crossing into Tunisia, many describing “gunfire, beatings, and targeted attacks” by Gaddafi’s forces and pro-regime militias. UNHCR’s reports were relayed to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), led by Navi Pillay, which synthesized them into briefings for the HRC. Pillay’s February 23, 2011, statement, calling for an international inquiry, cited “credible reports” of violence against civilians and migrants, partly based on UNHCR’s border assessments, which provided UNHCR staff interviews with refugees reporting “chaos and violence” in Libya. These reports supported the HRC’s rationale for Resolution S-15/1, which condemned “gross and systematic” violations.[12]
  1. In late February 2011, addressing the UN Security Council and General Assembly, Mr. Guterres publicly urged safe passage for refugees and aid workers. On February 24, 2011, he issued a statement calling for “unhindered access” to protect civilians, emphasizing attacks on migrants as a human rights violation. This call for “unhindered access” directly links to UN Resolution 1970 (2011) 2(c): “Ensure the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian agencies and workers, into the country” and to cl. 26 which provided: “Calls upon all Member States, working together and acting in cooperation with the Secretary General, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies”.
  • Mr. Guterres’ core provisions, calling for internal measures and so control within Libya, were repeated in UN Resolution 1973 (2011), which generally adopted Resolution 1970 and expressly stated: “Recalling paragraph 26 of resolution 1970 (2011) in which the Council expressed its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies”.
  • Plainly there is a direct analogy with Israel’s current refusal to ensure, “the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian agencies and workers, into the country”.

Secretary-General Moon’s role in expediting urgent response to genocide

  • The following details how quickly the UN moved in order to put Resolution 1973, the basis for overwhelming military intervention, before the General Assembly. It is this rapidity of action, in preventing genocide and indeed the corners cut and questionable processes engaged, which provides a precedent for similarly bold action against the genocide in Palestine. While it might be thought that this component of this submission is too detailed, it is submitted that when asserting precedent, it is essential to establish the factual basis, as precedent is only applicable in similar contexts.
  • On February 21, 2011, the UN Secretariat, apparently on the authority of Secretary-General Moon, platformed Mr. Dabbashi’s pivotal attack on the Libyan Government.  In this press conference at the UN headquarters, Mr. Dabbashi set the agenda to come, as follows: “The Libyan regime has already started a genocide against the Libyan people… We call on the UN to impose a no-fly zone to cut off all supplies of arms and mercenaries to the regime.”[13] Thus, it was at a UN press conference, a mere 6 or 7 days after protests broke out in Benghazi, that the agenda was set, for a no-fly zone. As no evidence was provided that arms and mercenaries were being flown into Libya, Libya having more arms than you could shake a stick at, this claim quietly morphed into a bombing campaign.
  • Mr. Dabbashi had been Libya’s deputy permanent representative, but he was plainly not representing the Libyan government in making this attack on it.  This UN press conference was billed: “Press Conference by Permanent Mission of Libya” when Mr. Dabbashi was not acting in the course of his employment and so was not lawfully a member of the “Permanent Mission of Libya”. The UN never disassociated itself from Mr. Dabbashi’s claims, even when its own investigations failed to find evidence of genocide. Moreover, after Mr. Dabbashi’s resignation as the Libyan UN representative, he appears to have been provided with de facto status within the UN, a status devoid of procedural or lawful foundation, until his replacement by the National Transitional Counsel ‘NTC’ representative.
  • The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) provides that states control diplomatic appointments. Commentary on the General Assembly Rules of Procedure, Rule 27 states that a Credentials Committee verifies delegation credentials, ensuring state authorization.[14] This means that only those authorised by their respective state have standing at the UN. Despite there being no lawful basis for the UN to allow an individual, who had ceased to represent the government who had appointed him to the UN, to make a public statement under the aegis of the UN, when genocide is in issue, such niceties can be brushed aside.
  • On March 5 2011 the Libyan government attempted to appoint Mr. Ali Abdussalam Treki as a representative to the United Nations, replacing Mohamed Shalgham, who had defected. Mr. Treki had served as the President of the 64th General Assembly of the UN and served three times as his country’s representative from 1982 to 1984, when he also chaired the General Assembly’s Fourth Committee (Decolonization) and represented Libya on the United Nations Commission on Human Rights; from 1986 to 1990; and most recently in 2003.  Earlier, in 1982, he served as a Vice-President of the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. A veteran in the fields of diplomacy and international relations, Mr. Treki served as Libya’s Ambassador to France from 1995 to 1999, as Permanent Representative to the League of Arab States in Cairo (Egypt) from 1991 to 1994, and as Foreign Minister from 1977 to 1980. Mr. Treki also played a significant role in the creation of the African Union and had been directly involved in mediating several conflicts in Africa, notably in the Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia-Eritrea and Djibouti-Eritrea, as well as in other parts of the world, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus and the Philippines. Over the course of a career spanning four decades, Mr. Treki led Libya’s delegation to numerous African summits and conferences including ministerial meetings of the former Organization of African Unity and, more recently, of the African Union Executive Council.  In addition, he headed the Libyan delegation to summits and conferences of the League of Arab States and chaired the League’s Council of Ministers from 1976 to 1977.  He also led his country’s delegation to summits and ministerial conferences of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and chaired the Council of Ministers of Islamic States.  He further headed Libya’s delegation to ministerial meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as to the Movement’s 1979 summit conference in Cuba.
  • The request for Mr. Treki’s appointment was communicated by the leader of the Libyan government, to the UN Secretary-General two weeks prior to Resolution 1973, in accordance with UN Rule 27 which provides: “The credentials of representatives and the names of members of a delegation shall be submitted to the Secretary-General if possible not less than one week before the opening of the session.”[15] The requirement that this nomination be provided “not less than one week before the opening of the session” relates to the session at which the State Party wants the nominated representative to represent it, by default the next session after the one-week “if possible” period required for consideration.
  • The 2011 Credentials Committee comprised of China, Russia and the United States, together in this case with Luxembourg, as the EU representative. As a great power door-keeper, Credential Committee’s deliberations are largely kept secret. Wikileaks has provided some public access to its machinations, such as in regard to Honduras in 2009[16]. There is no publically available record of the Committee’s consideration of Mr. Treki’s application, so it is unknown if in fact it was considered and if so, when. The timing of this is critical, as typically uncontested credentials are approved within weeks during regular sessions[17]. In the case of South Sudan, it took 5 days, on or about July 14, 2011[18]. An application could have been put before the general Assembly in any of the plenary sessions in April[19] and here were numerous plenary sessions prior to September period at which Mr. Treki’s credentialisation could have been put to the General Assembly. As discussed below, the issue of credentialisation of a representative for Libya was only dealt with at the General Assembly ‘GA’ plenary meeting on 16 September 2011. This was in breach of UN Rule 28 which provides:

A Credentials Committee shall be appointed at the beginning of each

session. It shall consist of nine members, who shall be appointed by the

General Assembly on the proposal of the President. The Committee shall

elect its own officers. It shall examine the credentials of representatives

and report without delay.

(emphasis added.)

  • All that appears to be publically available in regard the Libyan nomination process is the Committee’s report[20], of 16 September 2011, which makes no mention of the Treki referral and the discussion of that report at the UN 2nd plenary meeting of 16 September 2011, at which Mr. Al-Nasser Presided[21].  Mr. Al-Nasser was also the Representative of Qatar, the Arab League’s implacable opponent of Libyan oil and Colonel Gaddafi, which committed troops to overthrow him. There is a follow up report of the Committee, but this adds nothing.
  • At the 16 September 2011 meeting of the General Assembly the chair of the Credentials Committee stated:
                   The report lists all those Member States that had, at the time of the Committee’s      meeting on 14 September 2011, submitted formal credentials within the         meaning of rule 27 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.
  • As the process undertaken by Secretary-General Moon and the Credentials Committee is entirely opaque, it is unknown if this statement is false or misleading. It is known that an application for credentialisation of Mr. Treki was made to the Secretary-General. As the Libyan government gave notice to the Secretary-General of its proposed representative pursuant to UN Rule 27, “formal credentials” were submitted. That Mr. Treki’s application was rejected by the Committee did not mean it was not submitted, as implied by the Credential Committee’s claim that its report listed, “all those Member States that had, at the time of the Committee’s meeting on 14 September 2011, submitted formal credentials”. (emphasis added) As raised by the Angolan Representative at the GA meeting of 16 September 2011: “The Committee’s report [A/66/450] lacks transparency… We must ask why alternative credentials [Treki’s] were not considered.” (p. 23)
  • Moreover, this was not a simple matter of uncontroversial credentialisation but at issue was a contested one, which raised the criteria for statehood in a contested setting.

Criteria for statehood

  • The Credential Committee and apparently Secretary-General Moon proceeded as if the NTC merely required to have its application for credentials approved, a generally uncontroversial procedure, when in fact, it required consideration of whether admission as a new state was in issue.
  • The underlying cause of the Libyan government’s delegitimisation by the UN was an insurrectional secessionist movement in Cyrenaica. Moreover, Colonel Gaddafi’s position as leader was largely founded on his balancing of the West and Eastern tribal groupings interests. Once one of these factions had gone its own way, his middle ground position, as he literally hailed from central Sirte, was no longer tenable. As much as the NATO invasion, this is what doomed him. Post this insurrection in the East and until today, there now exists two states, where there once was one. That one names itself after the prior unitary State, does not automatically make it that state, as was in issue in the fall-out of NATO’s dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the claim to that State’s seat in the UN, by contending factions.
  • The criteria for Statehood is that set out in the Montevideo Convention (1933) which defines statehood as meeting the following criteria: (1) permanent population, (2) defined territory, (3) effective government, and (4) capacity to conduct international relations. The issue is not that the NTC could not meet these criteria, but that these criteria could not be assumed in this case, particularly in regard to “defined territory” but also, “(4) capacity to conduct international relations. This latter criteria came into play, depending on when the contending applications were made. Mr. Treki’s application to be recognised as the Libyan government’s UN representative and hence reflect it’s “capacity to conduct international relations” by a veteran diplomat, was made on 5 March 2011. Any late entry of the NTC candidate and the preferential treatment then accorded to its candidate, as discussed below, strongly indicated that at the first plenary session in April it was the Libyan government’s candidate who best met criteria (4).
  • As can be seen, the process by which these criteria could be resolved and subsequently inform any decision by the Security Council and the General Assembly were of a different order to credentualisation of a new representative of a pre-existing State party.  The UN Charter, at Article 18(2) provides that decisions on important questions, including membership, require a two-thirds majority, as set out in the General Assembly Rules of Procedure, Rule 83, whereas Rule 27 credentualisation of a new permanent representative of a pre-existing State party, already in the UN, is determined by simple majority.
  • Again there is the precedent that genocide trumps all and that even foundational rules of the UN can be cast aside in order to mitigate this risk.     

Controversy

  • The nature of conduct of the UN General Assembly session, at which the NTC candidate was approved is indicated by the UN press release title: After Much Wrangling, General Assembly Seats National Transitional Council of Libya as Country’s Representative (September 16, 2011)   This press release details a contentious debate, including opposition from the non-aligned states (e.g., Angola, Nicaragua) who argued the NTC was a NATO-imposed faction, not a legitimate government.  Nicaragua’s representative stating: “The National Transitional Council… is not the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. It is a faction imposed by NATO bombers.” (p. 24-25)[22]
  • This was plainly a controversial issue of the highest order, central to the nature of the UN itself and the tension between the colonialists and the colonialised. For the former to rig the game, by abstracting any reference to the Treki nomination, could be seen as contemptuous distain for the 3rd world in a disputed vote, with 32 nations either voting against recognition of the NTC representative or abstaining. However, it is submitted that the great powers were moved by a higher calling, to spare nothing in order to stamp out the risk of genocide.
  • In attempting to arrive at the extent of measures adopted in the Libyan context, the lack of UN transparency means that there are two possibilities in play:
  • Secretary General Moon did not inform the Credentials Committee of the Libyan government’s nomination of Mr Treki;
  • Despite being informed of the nomination by Secretary Moon, the Credentials Committee breached R27:28 and lied to the General assembly in order to cover up its unlawful conduct. 
  • While this may seem to leave the matter unresolved, together with the USA’s refusal of a visa to Mr Treki, preventing him from advocating for his credentialisation, there is an evidential basis for civil conspiracy. Assuming premise (a) above, the Credentials Committee were put on notice of the Treki nomination, at the latest by Angola’s protest on 16 September 2011. That the Credentials Committee took no steps to rectify the situation or even raise it, suggests it was in fact seized of the nomination. Assuming premise (b) above, Secretary Moon, fixed with knowledge of R27:28 by his office, knew or must have known, after a matter of weeks, that somehow the nomination process had miscarried and was under an obligation to make enquiries, but which given the outcome, could not have been made. In the case of the USA, there is also propensity evidence.
  • The purpose of this submission is not to suggest that Secretary-General Moon, Russia, China, USA and the EU, by its Luxemburgian plenipotentiary, should be tried for conspiracy, but rather that there is an evidential basis that they either independently acted illegally, or entered into a conspiracy to break the UN Rules and the laws of natural justice to deny Libya the right to be heard, in relation to its own fate. As set out above, Mr Treki was a seasoned diplomat with very strong associations with the African Union. His potential, as a UN representative, advocating for the Libyan government and marshalling opposition to military intervention, is demonstrated by the unlawful and deceitful conduct of those who blocked his appointment. Moreover, given his depth of experience in mediating conflict zones, the conflict between West and East Libya might have been resolved. As discussed in ‘UN Security Council Sanctions and Mediation in Libya’ (July 4, 2022),[23]  the UN policy here displayed a dysfunctional ambivalence between mediation and intervention.
  • The key point is again that where there is genocide or real risk of genocide, as crimes against humanity are being committed, even the right to be heard must give way and the Libyan precedent is authority for there being no requirement that Israel be given an opportunity to respond to the Application, as this permits delay and so further genocide or risk of genocide.

Application of Resolutions 1970 & 1973 to the genocide in Gaza

  • While these two resolutions were rolled out as a two-stage strategy, this does not detract from their validity, as all means are valid in the suppression of genocide. As one builds on the other and the latter refers to the former, only relevant parts of Resolution 1973 ‘1973’ most relevant to the current genocide will be set out here. 1973 begins by listing wrongs, indistinguishable from those wrongs with the Court is burdened with in full measure in this application. 1973 refers to: “grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties. This if anything would understate the situation in Gaza. It reiterates the responsibility of State authorities to “protect the population” and reaffirms that “parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians”. Plainly Israel has failed in this obligation. 1973 condemns gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions, all too familiar in the Gaza genocide. 1973 further condemns “acts of violence and intimidation committed by the

Libyan authorities against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel”. None of the UN claims about the Libyan government viewed in preparation for this submission explicitly describe such conduct in Libya, but the murder of literally hundreds of journalists and the like in Gaza is an act un-paralleled in war, deserving of universal condemnation. Similarly, 1973 does not refer to attacks on medical personal. The targeted assassination and mass incarceration of medical personnel by the state of Israeli is inhuman conduct, rarely seen in war and conducted here on a scale never before seen.

  • While superficially Resolution 1973 could be seen as not actually permitting overwhelming military intervention, this was simply legerdermain for public relations purposes. The imposition of a “no fly zone” together with the ability to take “all necessary measures” provided the platform for the action no fly zone, first advocated for at the UN press conference on 21 February 2011.  This predictable outcome was known at the time. Cuban delegate Pedro Núñez Mosquera explicitly warned that military intervention would cause mass civilian deaths (UNSC S/PV.6498, 17 March 2011, pp. 7–8)[24]. His prediction proved accurate: NATO’s campaign killed thousands, including during the siege of Sirte. See also Cuba’s opposition in UNSC Resolution 1973 voting records (S/RES/1973).[25] “Cuba—a small Global South nation—saw through NATO’s ruse in 2011, while powerful states enabled catastrophe. Today, the same states shield Israel. The playbook hasn’t changed.”
  • The bombing commenced on 19 March 2011 and continued despite the Libyan government’s agreement to a ceasefire on 10 April 2011. The slaughter continued at least till the torture and murder of Colonel Gadaffi on 20 October 2011, together with the killing of his son Mutassim and about 67 other members of his convoy on that day. In all this time no challenge was made to the reach of Resolution 1973, by any members of the Security Council.

Bosnia v Serbia

  • While these submissions engage with the precedent created by the UN response to the Libyan situation, this is because of the very proximal analogies that can be drawn to the Application and the situation in Palestine. However, it must not be forgotten that the UN Libyan response is itself patterned on the UN response to NATO’s dismemberment of Yugoslavia and so we are looking at a long term UN policy in regard to State Party’s violent suppression of internal dissent. In Bosnia v. Serbia (2007) the ICJ ruled that Serbia had a positive duty prevent the Srebrenica genocide pursuant to Article IX of the Genocide Convention.

Analogous international condemnation to the ongoing risk of genocide in Gaza

  • Continuing with the analogy with events in Libya in 2011, at the Sixty-fifth General Assembly Plenary 76th Meeting Secretary-General Moon stated that:

“The world has spoken with one voice: we demand an immediate end to the violence against civilians and full respect for their fundamental human rights, including those of peaceful assembly and free speech,” said Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in his address to the Assembly.  He welcomed the recommendation of the Human Rights Council to suspend Libya’s membership “so long as the violence continued”.

  • Mr. Ban also commended the Security Council’s decision over the weekend to refer the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court, and called for the urgent dispatching of an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate alleged violations of international human rights in the country, in line with the Human Rights Council’s recommendation.[26] 
  • SUSAN RICE (United States) said the unprecedented suspension of Libya from the Human Rights Council was a “harsh rebuke, but one that Libya’s leaders had brought down upon themselves”.  She said the United States continued to be appalled by the situation in Libya.  “This action sends another clear warning to Mr. Qadhafi and those who stand by him: they must stop the killing.”  The General Assembly had come together “to speak with one voice to Libya’s unrepentant rulers”.  When the only way that a leader could cling to power was to violate the human rights of his own people, he had lost all legitimacy to rule.  “He must go, and he must go now,” she said.
  • TSUNEO NISHIDA (Japan) said his delegation was deeply concerned about the “gross and systematic violations of human rights” currently being committed by the Libyan Government, and had co-sponsored the resolution to suspend Libya’s membership in the Human Rights Council. 
  • CHRISTIAN WENAWESER (Liechtenstein), welcoming the Assembly’s action, voiced grave concern at the possibility that crimes against humanity were being committed in Libya “at this very moment”.
  • GARY FRANCIS QUINLAN (Australia) said the gross human rights violations in Libya warranted that country’s suspension from Human Rights Council.  It was untenable that “a regime so clearly failing in its responsibility” would be fit to serve on such a United Nations body.
  • JIM MCLAY (New Zealand) expressed his condolences to the victims’ families.  The Libyan regime’s systematic use of force evoked memories of the actions of other tyrants.  That use of force could constitute crimes against humanity.  “No regime has the right to turn its own country and the lives of its own people into a living hell,”.
  • Plainly all these statements apply a fortiori to Israel in the present circumstances and to its Leader Mr. Netanyahoo.

Legal principles

  • As set out above, it was the real risk of genocide in Libya which validated the destruction of the Libyan government, by massive military intervention. Plainly the Court has no such executive power. However, it is submitted that this precedent provides that the real risk of genocide, arising from ongoing crimes against humanity, calls for the most extreme sanction. As submitted below, the most extreme sanction the Court can impose is to find that as Israel has persistently violated the Principles contained in the UN Charter, the Security Council should recommend to the General Assembly, that Israel be expelled from the UN for breach of Chapter II Article 6. This is not an empty gesture, as comity obliges proportionate consideration by the Security Council, which functions as the executive within the UN constitutional framework. Moreover, on the authority of the Libyan precedent, Israel has by its own conduct, forgone the right to be heard.
  • The submissions set out above demonstrate a binding legal precedent, which demands parity of action. The most fundamental principle of law is equality before the law and without this principle there is no law. As such it forms a central part of the Preamble to the United Nations Charter, as follows: “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” There is no law for Serbia and another for Israel, there is no law for Libya and another for Israel. Precedent and parity are expressions of this fundamental principle. Justice must be blind and the scales evenly balanced, without this we have no law.
  • The critical feature of this precedent is that it is not genocide, but real risk of genocide, on the basis of evidence of crimes against humanity, that triggers ultimate sanction.
  • The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides:

Article VIII

Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.

  • The UN Charter, Chapter II Article 6 provides:

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

  • The state of Israel has violated “Principles contained in the present Charter” such as the principle of “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small” since the Nakba. Putting aside all the violation from then to current times, this Application was filed on 29 December 2023 and has since been joined by a host of nations. While under the purview of this Court, in contumelious disregard for the Court’s acceptance of the Application, even on a prima facie basis, together with the concerns of leading members of the Secretariat and foundational organs of the UN, the state of Israel has persistently continued in its violations, unabated, despite the cumulative damage of its actions.
  • It is submitted that the above submissions, when considered together with the evidence provided by those supporting the Application, ground the following premises:
  • In both the Yugoslavian and Libyan theatres, when insurrectionary succession movements arose, the UN adopted a policy of preventing further crimes against humanity, being committed against such insurrectionaries, by either sanctioning or sponsoring overwhelming military intervention, directed against the State Party engaged in crimes against humanity;
  • In Libya the use of overwhelming military intervention to counter genocide was a key driver, from its UN endorsed articulation by Mr. Dabbashi to Resolutions 1970 & 1973;
  • In this application genocide is asserted, as is the application of Article IX of the Genocide Convention;
  • The crimes against humanity which have triggered the UN sponsoring of overwhelming military intervention are systemic acts of violence against non-combatant civilians;
  • The catalogued crimes against humanity and other war crimes which in Libya precipitated the sponsoring of overwhelming military intervention are vastly overmatched by the same crimes against humanity and other war crimes which have been committed by Israel against the civilian population of Gaza;
  • The period for which such crimes have been allowed to continue in Gaza, is vastly longer than that which pertained in Libya.
  • The vast disparity between the extent of crimes against humanity committed by the government of Libya and those committed and continuing to be committed by the government of Israel leaves no room for nuance or doubt. The evidence screams at you and is heard by the whole world.
  • There is an alternative premise that can be derived from these submissions. Secretary-General Guterre’s role in the destruction of the Libyan government and the dismemberment of Libya in 2011 compares badly with his failure to take comparable steps in regard to Israel. This demonstrates that the Secretary-General is two-faced, to the point of fraud, or has failed the UN in its first objective, which seems to be needed to be recalled:

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind …

  • The Preamble to the United Nations Charter continues to state that the purpose of the United Nations is “to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest. There is no common interest in armies butchering children. Again we are reduced to failing back on the most basic tenets of civilization. While it could be argued that the power of the UN is sequestered by the Security Council, in comparable entities to the UN, ministers of parliaments and leaders with integrity choose resignation over dishonor. How would the Security Council look if the Secretary General and all the high ranking officers of the Secretariat walked out? That hasn’t happened, so are we left with a zombie organization that moves only tectonically, by continental grift?
  •  Meanwhile, the General Assembly is a trance, hypnotised by awards of honorifics and other geegaws, it has succumbed to the veto power of the Security Council, itself a collection of walruses and carpenters. This thieves’ kitchen figures here twice, once in its Credentials Committee short form, duping the General Assembly by concealing the Libyan government’s attempt to regularize its formal standing with the UN and again in its long form, duping the world with its “no fly-zone” that devastated cities and brought death from the air to so many. And so the UN follows the League of Nations, as a failed project and for the same reasons.
  • In this tragic situation, it falls to the ICJ to uphold the principles it and the UN were founded on. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer[27]  an emergency powers case heard during the Korean war, Supreme Court Justice Jackson, who had been the lead US counsel to the Nuremberg Tribunal, struck a note of foreboding, warning:

Vast accretions of federal power, eroded from that reserved by the States, have magnified the scope of presidential activity. Subtle shifts take place in the centers of real power that do not show on the face of the Constitution.[28]

  • But it is Justice Jackson’s final words that are most chilling. Speaking of the US Constitution, he wrote:

Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.[29] 

  • After the failure of the General Assembly and the Secretariat, that is the duty of the ICJ,  to hold fast to the basic norms the UN was founded on and to hold genocidal States to account. The UN Charter Chapter II Article 6 provides:

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

  • The Court has no executive power, but it has a moral suasion. Israeli has “persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter”. It is time for the ICJ to speak truth to power, or shut itself down. The only thing worse than lack of justice, is a façade of justice.

16 May 2025

______________

G E Minchin

counsel


[1] https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2011/2/4d63f0b39/unhcr-responds-libya-crisis.html

[2] https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/110221_Libya.doc.htm

[3] https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libya-crisis-situation-report-no-1

[4] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2011/02/pillay-calls-international-inquiry-libyan-violence-and- justice-victims

[5] https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2011/2/4d66a7b29/unhcr-calls-safe-passage-libya.html

[6] https://undocs.org/A/HRC/S-15/1

[7] https://undocs.org/S/RES/1970(2011)

[8] https://web.archive.org/web/20150912040003/https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/bio412

[9] https://web.archive.org/web/20110308005950/https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE72400H

[10] https://undocs.org/S/RES/1973(2011)

[11] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/4/10/au-team-arrives-in-libya-to-push-for-ceasefire

[12] https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/ga11047.doc.htm (Archived here)

[13] https://undocs.org/A/66/450

[14] https://undocs.org/A/66/PV.7

[15] http://www.cubaminrex.cu/en/cuba-reiterates-opposition-foreign-intervention-libya

[16] https://undocs.org/A/520/Rev.20

[17] https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09UNNEWYORK639_a.html

[18] https://undocs.org/A/RES/65/308

[19] https://press.un.org/en/2011/ga11137.doc.htm

[20] https://www.icj-cij.org/case/91

[21] https://undocs.org/S/PV.6498

[22] https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sgsm13450.doc.htm

[23] https://brill.com/view/journals/gg/28/3/article-p383_383.xml

[24] UN Press Release GA/11047 (archived here).

[25] S/RES/1973

[26] Press Release SC/10187.)

[27] 343 U.S. 579 (1952). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/343/579/

[28] Ibid 653.

[29] Ibid 655.

Corruption of Blood: The End of a Rules-Based World Order

Abstract

In its foreign policy, the US purports to found its actions on a “rules-based order”. What exactly comprises a rules-based world order is a matter of debate, but it must be founded on rules, which have certain properties. These properties arise from both the logic of rules and are to be found in legal decisions which consider the exercise of executive discretion. President Obama’s foreign policy executive orders in regard to Crimea “the Executive Orders” could not be described as being founded on a rules-based order and are profoundly at odds with classic US jurisprudence. However, modern US jurisprudence is itself in retreat from its constitutional high ground, despite formally acknowledging principles which underlie earlier decisions.

1. Introduction

Rules nominate a set of prohibited behaviors, for which penalties attach. Nomination entails publication, providing that the rule is known or at least knowable. The requirement of publication is founded on rules being a guide to behavior, penalty deriving from knowing transgression or at least reckless indifference. From this stems the Law’s abhorrence of retrospectivity, as rules cannot guide behavior if imposed post facto. Another central feature of rules is that like cases are treated alike, as a rule is a constant, during its term. A process that is applied unevenly is not a rule. At best there is a set of rules, provided it is clear which set applies to whom. Similarly, there must be one standard, rulers of different lengths cannot comprise one rule. Penalty must follow from breach as rules cannot be a guide to behavior if they are applied without fault. It follows that rules can only impose personal liability. This essay does not exhaustively discuss what rules are, but sets out those central features that any fair rules-based order must exhibit, as follows:

1) The rule is known or at least knowable, rules cannot operate retrospectivity;

2) Rules must have internal consistency;

3) Like cases are treated alike, one standard applies to all;

4) Penalty derives from knowing transgression or at least reckless indifference;

5) Personal, not collective liability.

This essay interprets core US Supreme Court decisions on presidential powers in terms of primary rules. It then looks at the way the Executive Orders directly contradict primary rules and so is the antithesis of a rules-based order. Also considered is the retrograde tendency in the modern Supreme Court, away from upholding primary rules, as found in and derived from the US Constitution. This despite never having overruled earlier cases, which strongly upheld primary rules and overruling cases which did not.

2. Ex Parte Merryman (1861)1

Ex parte Merryman (1861) is an American Civil War opinion by chief justice “CJ” Taney condemning President Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus. The focus in Merryman and the focus in cases involving presidential discretion has been the US Constitution’s apportionment of powers, between the Executive and the Legislature. This essay does not address the US constitutional balance as such and interprets these cases in terms of primary rules. In Ex parte Merryman CJ Taney held:

117 F. Cas. 144, 9 Am. Law Reg. 524; 24 Law Rep. 78; 3 West. Law Month. 461 (1861).  

The president not only claims the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus himself, at his discretion, but to delegate that discretionary power to a military officer, and to leave it to him to determine whether he will or will not obey judicial process that may be served upon him.

Here CJ Taney is referencing the hated “Writs of Assistance” which played such a large part in triggering the American Revolution. In James Otis’s February 1761 speech to the Superior Court of Massachusetts, in opposition to the Writs, the first ill he raised was the general delegation of the writs, as follows:

In the first place, the writ is universal, being directed “to all and singular justices, sheriffs, constables, and all other officers and subjects”; so that, in short, it is directed to every subject in the King’s dominions. Everyone with this writ may be a tyrant; if this commission be legal, a tyrant in a legal manner…

The issue that is addressed here is that while it may be that such powers can be carefully weighed by a President, once it is delegated it becomes of much wider application. Delegated, the power rests in many lesser minds and can become a vehicle for vindictiveness and vendetta, as Otis examples in his speech. The dynamic is such that even in cases of such abuse, the Administration will tend defend its application, to preserve its authority. This is a process argument, which goes to the real world effect of executive power.

This issue also arose in Taney CJ’s referencing of English precedent, noting Blackstone (1 Bl. Comm. 136) to the effect that only parliament could suspend the writ of habeas corpus, where he stated:

If the president of the United States may suspend the writ, then the constitution of the United States has conferred upon him more regal and absolute power over the liberty of the citizen, than the people of England have thought it safe to entrust to the crown; a power which the queen of England cannot exercise at this day, and which could not have been lawfully exercised by the sovereign even in the reign of Charles I.

In referencing Charles I, Taney CJ is comparing President Abraham with the most potent symbol of arbitrariness among the American revolutionaries and the English Civil War, in which divine right was pitched against constitutionalism. CJ Taney also pointed to a fundamental aspect of rules, that they must be proclaimed and set about with procedural formality as follows:

No official notice has been given to the courts of justice, or to the public, by proclamation or otherwise, that the president claimed this power, and had exercised it in the manner stated in the return.

Legal precedent is a form of rules and CJ Taney relied on the precedential conduct of President Jefferson, who on the occasion of the Aaron Burr conspiracy, rather than acting executively, advocated to Congress for the suspension of a habeas corpus writ. The chief justice addressed the constitutional provisions, which reserved power to suspend habeas corpus to Congress and continued on, to enumerate the limitations on executive power, set out in the Constitution and the overriding application of due process, as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, together with the fair trial rights set out in the Sixth Amendment, both first order US constitutional rules. The chief justice then considered exigency stating:

The government of the United States is one of delegated and limited powers; it derives its existence and authority altogether from the constitution, and neither of its branches, executive, legislative- or judicial, can exercise any of the powers of government beyond those specified and granted; for the tenth article of the amendments to the constitution, in express terms, provides that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people.

Here CJ Taney’s opinion was that the US Constitution was the only source of Executive power and that there was no inherent presidential power. This approach demands that all legal exercises of executive power by an American president are delimited by rules.

3. Korematsu v. United States (1944)2

In 1942 President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, placing Japanese Americans into concentration camps during World War II. This Order entailed two conflicting sanctions laid on Japanese Americans, that they stay within their locality and that they report to detention centers. Korematsu was charged with refusing to leave his home. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this order by a majority. The mainstay of the majority opinion in Korematsu was precedent and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hirabayashi v. United States (1943)3, which held that the imposition of a night time curfew of US citizens of Japanese descent was permissible. Of Hirabayashi, in his dissent in Korematsu, Justice Jackson said:

We yielded, and the Chief Justice guarded the opinion as carefully as language will do…

However, in spite of our limiting words we did validate a discrimination on the basis of ancestry for mild and temporary deprivation of liberty. Now the principle of racial discrimination is pushed from support of mild measures to very harsh ones, and from temporary deprivations to indeterminate ones. And the precedent which it is said requires us to do so is Hirabayashi.4

Justice Jackson continued:

Now, if any fundamental assumption underlies our system, it is that guilt is personal and not inheritable. Even if all of one’s antecedents had been convicted of treason, the Constitution forbids its penalties to be visited upon him, for it provides that “no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted.5

Similarly, Justice Murphy (1981) stated:

2323 U.S. 214 (1944). 3320 U.S. 81 (1943). 4Op cit 247. 5453 U.S. 654 (1981). 6Op cit 240.  

To infer that examples of individual disloyalty prove group disloyalty and justify discriminatory action against the entire group is to deny that under our system of law individual guilt is the sole basis for deprivation of rights. Moreover, this inference, which is at the very heart of the evacuation orders, has been used in support of the abhorrent and despicable treatment of minority groups by the dictatorial tyrannies which this nation is now pledged to destroy.6

Both Justice Roberts and Murphy qualified the broad discretion necessary for military decisions, Justice Murphey finding that: “No pronouncement of the commanding officer can, in my view, preclude judicial inquiry and determination whether an emergency ever existed and whether, if so, it remained, at the date of the restraint out of which the litigation arose.7 Justice Roberts set out a “chronologic recitation of events” which demonstrated that the rules put in place were nothing more than a “disingenuous attempt to camouflage the compulsion which was to be applied”8. Justice Murphy subjected the “Final Report” of Lt. Gen J L DeWitt, the commanding officer charged with internment, to a close and wilting analysis, highlighting reference to “an enemy race”9 and showing it lacked “reliable evidence to ground its assumptions”.10 Murphy J also noted that while the Order was founded on exigency, this did not accord with the application of the Order, saying that: “Leisure and deliberation seem to have been more of the essence than speed”11.

7Ibid 231. 8Ibid 236 Note 5. 9Ibid 236. 10Ibid. 11Ibid 241. 12Ibid 245. 13Ibid 246. 14Ibid.  

Justice Jackson, had been both United States Solicitor General and Attorney General, as well as chief United States prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials. Having seen the functioning of the executive, from the inside, he warned of the difficulty the Court had in second-guessing military assessments stating:

In the very nature of things, military decisions are not susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal. They do not pretend to rest on evidence, but are made on information that often would not be admissible and on assumptions that could not be proved. Information in support of an order could not be disclosed to courts without danger that it would reach the enemy. Neither can courts act on communications made in confidence. Hence courts can never have any real alternative to accepting the mere declaration of the authority that issued the order that it was reasonably necessary from a military viewpoint.12

Justice Jackson then stated that because the Court could not properly assess the reasonableness of an exercise of military authority, it should not enter into this arena, as it had done in Hirabayashi. It was Justice Jackson’s opinion that it was the Court’s validation of military orders, which was more dangerous than the orders themselves, as follows:

A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image.13 …But even if they were permissible military procedures, I deny that it follows that they are constitutional.14

Finally Jackson J warned: “If the people ever let command of the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, the courts wield no power equal to its restraint.15

Applying the dissenting judges’ opinions to the indicia of rules adopted here, President Truman’s Executive Order fails to conform with a rules-based order as follows:

1) The Order was retrospective and so not a rule. Although exigency may necessitate executive orders, Jackson J’s opinion was that the gravest error was to imbue them with the imprimatur of constitutionality, as that made an isolated incident into a precedent;

2) Effectively, the Order required Japanese Americans to both stay in their locality and report to detention centers, as discussed by Roberts J, and so was internally inconsistent;

3) The Order failed to treat like cases alike, Murphy J pointing to the different treatment accorded to Japanese Americans, as opposed to Italian or German Americans;

15Op cit 248. 16343 U.S. 579 (1952). 17Ibid 582. 18Ibid 640.  

4) Penalty did not derive from knowing transgression or reckless indifference, but sprang purely from race;

5) The Order imposed collective liability.

4. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952)16

President Truman invoked emergency powers during the Korean Civil War to seize private US steel mills shut down by a strike, on the basis that the steel was needed for the war effort and to prevent a “national catastrophe”17. The difficulty with this proposition was that although the US was doing the heavy lifting for South Korea, it was not technically at war, being just part of the UN peace- keeping force. Most importantly the Soviet Union, China and the US had quickly arrived at and adhered to informal parameters to contain the conflict, which meant that the US was never under threat of radical escalation. The Administration relied on the President’s military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and theater of war cases, arguing, inter alia, that as Article II of the Constitution stated that the executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America, this provided “a grant of all the executive powers of which the Government is capable”18, as commented on by Justice Jackson.

The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Order, the majority principally relying on the constitutional separation of powers and Congress having expressly decided against seizures in cases of emergency. Giving the majority opinion Justice Black held that:

When the Taft Hartley Act was under consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an amendment which would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of emergency.19

The “generative” factors identified by Justice Jackson in Korematsu featured in Frankfurter, J’s concurrence, as follows:

The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority…20

19Ibid 586 20Ibid 594. 21Ibid 632. 22Ibid 594. 23Ibid 646. 24Ibid 642.  

Justice Douglas concurring, held that “the theory of checks and balances expounded by Mr. Justice Black [tied in with] condemnation provision in the Fifth Amendment”21. Justice Jackson also made this point stating:

The third clause in which the Solicitor General finds seizure powers is that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed…”22 That authority must be matched against words of the Fifth Amendment that “No person shall be…deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. One gives a governmental authority that reaches so far as there is law, the other gives a private right that authority shall go no farther. These signify about all there is of the principle that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.23

Justice Jackson concurring, agreed with the majority, that to override express congressional provision, the presidential power sought was one that sought unlimited executive power, as follows:

The example of such unlimited executive power that must have most impressed the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III, and the description of its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating their new Executive in his image.

Justice Jackson next addressed the Government’s reliance on the Constitution’s bestowal of the rank of the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy on the President, stating:

But no doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me more sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his own commitment of the Nation’s armed forces to some foreign venture.24

In response to the claim of necessity and the alleged lacuna in the Constitution to provide for this, Jackson J, speaking of the Founding Fathers, stated:

They knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that they suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies.25

Jackson J went on to discuss that whereas both in France and Britain, emergency powers were subject to parliamentary authority the Weimar Constitution allowed the President to assume emergency powers, stating:

This proved a temptation to every government, whatever its shade of opinion, and in 13 years suspension of rights was invoked on more than 250 occasions. Finally, Hitler persuaded President Von Hindenberg to suspend all such rights, and they were never restored.26

Jackson J then grounded this approach on conflict of interest, as follows:

Emergency powers are consistent with free government only when their control is lodged elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them. That is the safeguard that would be nullified by our adoption of the “inherent powers” formula.27

Jackson J concluded his concurrence by stating that law must control power, as follows:

The essence of our free Government is “leave to live by no man’s leave, underneath the law”—to be governed by those impersonal forces which we call law.28

With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.29

25Ibid 650. 26Ibid 651. 27Ibid 653. 28Ibid 654. 29Ibid 655.  

The opinions of the majority in Youngtown do not neatly fit the indicia for rules adopted here, as they rejected the Executive Order on the basis that the Executive Order fundamentally clashed with the rules-based order set out in and derived from the US Constitution. Recalling CJ Taney’s opinion, that the President had only those powers expressly provided in the Constitution, the majority was clearly very concerned the President sought “a grant of all the executive powers of which the Government is capable”. Beneath the majorities reliance on Congress having determined the issue, both Black CJ and Douglas J referred to the Constitutional system of checks and balances, Douglas J also referring to the conflict with the 5th Amendment. Frankfurter and Jackson JJ both discussed executive power’s tendency to expand and the rationales for constraint by law.

5. Bills of Attainder

As discussed below, President Obama’s Executive Orders bear many of the features of bills of attainder. Article 1 S9 of the US Constitution provides: “No State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.” Technically, a bill of attainder is a proscription and imposes the death penalty, as opposed to a “bill of pain and penalty”, which imposes a penalty less than death. However, in Fletcher v. Peck (1810)30 the US Supreme Court insisted that Art 1 S9 encompasses both, holding that, “a Bill of Attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both.” In Drehman v. Stifle (1869)31 the US Supreme Court held that the “term ‘bill of attainder’ in the National Constitution is generical, and embraces bills of both classes.” In Cummings v. Missouri (1867)32, the US Supreme Court stated that: “A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.” Clearly a bill is produced by a legislature, but it is a legislature acting at the behest of an executive, as the following passage from Cummings v Missouri shows:

3010 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 3175 U.S. 8 Wall. 595 595 (1869). 3271 US 277 – Supreme Court 1867. 33878 F. 3d 662. (2018). 34453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981). 35Ibid 833. 36Op cit 635. 37Cleveland State Law Review Volume 31 Issue 1 Article 1982.  

“Bills of this sort,” says Mr. Justice Story, “have been most usually passed in England in times of rebellion, or gross subserviency to the crown, or of violent political excitements; periods, in which all nations are most liable (as well the free as the enslaved) to forget their duties, and to trample upon the rights and liberties of others.” (Citation omitted)

6. Modern US Jurisprudence

In Trump v Hawaii (2018)33 Sotomayor J put Korematsu into issue. The majority found that Korematsu had no relevance, but Korematsu has long been criticized and the Supreme Court took the opportunity to formally overrule it. This left the minority opinions in Korematsu good law. These opinions were akin to the majority opinions in Youngtown, which has never been overruled. However in Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981)34, the Supreme Court had heard a case involving executive orders by both Presidents Carter and Regan. Despite the context being the Iran Hostage crisis, which shortly after morphed into Contra-Gate, the Court in Dames & Moore assiduously avoided any of Jackson J’s warnings in Youngtown. The only nod to Jackson J’s Youngtown opinion was reference to his tripartite division of Congressional stance vis a vis presidential discretion, which Rehnquist CJ described as “analytically useful”35 when Jackson himself described it as “somewhat oversimplified”36 and it is statutory interpretation 101. That did not stop Rehnquist’s ruling being lauded by David F. Forte, who in his “The Foreign Affairs Power: The Dames & (and) Moore Case (1982)”37 extolls Rehnquist CJ’s use of Jackson J tripartite division, but ignored Jackson J’s truly trenchant observations.

In regard to bills of attainder, historically Art1 S9 was broadly interpreted and was described as a “bulwark against tyranny,” in United States v. Brown (1965)38. However, in Global Relief Foundation Inc v O’Neill (2002)39, a US appeals court held that Art1 S9 only applied to legislation and was inapplicable to presidential decree. This approach ignored executive overreach and that in making domestic law; the presidential decree was purporting to legislate. It also ignored Jackson J’s 1952 observations in Youngstown which warned that the rise of the party system rendered the distinction between legislature and executive moot, as follows:

38381 U.S. 437 (1965). 39207 F Supp 2d 779 (ND Ill 2002). 40Op cit 654.  

Moreover, rise of the party system has made a significant extraconstitutional supplement to real executive power. No appraisal of his necessities is realistic which overlooks that he heads a political system as well as a legal system. Party loyalties and interests, sometimes more binding than law, extend his effective control into branches of government other than his own and he often may win as a political leader, what he cannot command under the Constitution.40

7. President Obama’s Foreign Policy Executive Orders –
Purported Basis in Legislation

Previous US presidential invocations of national emergency war powers were at times that the US was at war or under direct attack. No doubt President Bush’s 9/11 executive orders, together with the Patriot Act, enormously extended executive power in the US. These have never been relinquished by the Administration, as follows:

Because the terrorist threat continues, the national emergency declared on September 14, 2001, and the powers and authorities adopted to deal with that emergency must continue in effect beyond September 14, 2021. Therefore, I am continuing in effect for an additional year the national emergency that was declared on September 14, 2001, with respect to the terrorist threat. This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress. J.R. BIDEN, JR.

That being said, President Obama’s orders were a radical departure from precedent. The US had not suffered an attack, still less was it at war. Two issues are examined here:

1) The extent to which these orders maintained a climate of purported national emergency;

2) The extent to which these orders and their successors demonstrates that the radical changes to the nature of American government warned of by Jackson J in Youngtown have come to pass.

In 2014 President Obama, promulgated the Executive Orders namely EO 13660 of 6 March 2014. EO 13661 of 16 March 2014, EO 13662 of 20 March 2014 and EO 13685 of 19 December 2014. These Orders were founded on the following statutory provisions:

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

Section 301 of title 3, United States Code is the general provision which empowers a president to delegate “any function which is vested in the President by law” and provides no lawful authorisation for the Orders. Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 provides an executive power to deem “classes of aliens” to be “ineligible for visas or admission”. This provision provides for broad executive powers as to who might enter the US and prima facie provides a legal basis to deny entry to the US to the persons nominated pursuant to the Orders. However, this was not the thrust of the Orders, which was to freeze assets.

The specific section of the NEA referred to in the Orders is 50 U.S.C. 1601 which provides for the termination of declared emergencies and provides for a default 2-year period for use of emergency powers, a criterion which has not been complied with. It is unclear why the Order refers to s1601 when it is s1621 which provides for the “Declaration of national emergency by President”. The reference in the Order extends “et seq” and so relies on subsequent s1621 of the NEA which provides:

(a) With respect to Acts of Congress authorizing the exercise during the period of a national emergency, of any special or extraordinary power, the President is authorized to declare such national emergency.

413 U.S. 386 (1798).  

As held by Chase CJ in Calder v. Bull (1798)41: “All the powers delegated by the people of the United States to the Federal Government are defined, and NO CONSTRUCTIVE powers can be exercised by it…”. Clearly any declaration of a national emergency is not simply rhetorical and the purpose of such a declaration is to allow for presidential recourse to “special or extraordinary power”. Section 1621 provides that the President is authorized to declare such national emergency only “with respect to Acts of Congress authorizing the exercise during the period of a national emergency”. As section 1621 refers to there being “a national emergency” prior to a president’s declaration of “such emergency”, it must be that whether or not a national emergency exists is a question for Congress. Section 1621 provides that Congress must first authorise a president’s use of “special or extraordinary power” prior to a presidential declaration of a national emergency. Such an interpretation accords with any declaration of war being within the legislative and not executive domain. Congress never having considered either whether there was a “national emergency” or authorizing “special or extraordinary power”, the Orders were prima facie unconstitutional. Section 1621 creates two ambits of authority:

(a) The exercise of “special or extraordinary powers” which Acts of Congress have authorized a president to use during the period of a national emergency.

(b) The exercise of normal presidential powers during the period of a national emergency.

President Obama had no authority under (a), Congress never having found there to be a national emergency nor authorizing President Obama “special or extraordinary powers”, in response to the Crimean situation. He had no authority under (b) as the gross violations of fundamental law by President Obama, as discussed below, could not be described as an exercise of normal presidential powers.

The overarching provision the NEA falls under is TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE, An interpretation of the term “national emergency”, consistent with Title 50, requires such an emergency to be a military emergency engaging defense of the nation. Such an interpretation is consistent with the litigation, Korematsu arising during WWII and Youngtown during the Korean War. In Dames & Moore, the invasion of the US embassy in the Iranian hostage crisis was by international law an invasion of US soil. President Bush’s declaration of a national emergency over 9/11 was founded on the claim of a, “continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States”, even if this was evidence free.

Section 1702(C) of Title 50 sets out presidential authorities in general and provides for freezing of assets, as follows:

…when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against the United States;

As the United States was not engaged in armed hostilities nor had been attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals in the Crimean situation there was no national emergency and President Obama’s asset seizures were unlawful. There remains necessity, but the necessity invoked by Lincoln was civil war and the inability of Congress to even gather. Nothing remotely like this order of necessity arose as a consequence of the Crimean situation.

The last legislative provision relied on by the Orders, the IEEPA, expanded the application of the NEA by providing for declarations of national emergencies arising from threats to the “national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” However, while the source of threats was expanded, Section 1701 IEEPA required that any such threat must be “unusual and extraordinary”. Taken at its worst the amalgamation of Crimea into the Russian Federation was an act of annexation. There is no evidence of any bloodshed. In 2011 President Obama had waged war against Libya, destroying its capital, killing its leader among tens of thousands of Libyans and tearing the country in two. President Bush waged major wars against Afghanistan and Iraq. The only way the Russian action could be said to be “unusual and extraordinary” is if a double standard is applied. But one rule for the US and another for Russia is the law of the jungle, not a rules-based order.

Crucially, the IEEPA retained the threshold that any purported threat must rise to the level of a “national emergency”. This takes us back to s1621 NEA and the lack of Congressional authorisation. The basis for S1621 “special or extraordinary powers”, being exercised directly by the executive can only be necessity, where there is a national emergency that is so urgent that the deliberative process of Congress is too slow to address the situation. While this essay maintains that there was never a national emergency, the succession of orders President Obama promulgated could not meet this threshold, as it could not be said that Congress was unable to address events over the period of the orders, from March to December 2014.

In as much as President Obama’s Orders were akin to the form of legalized piracy known as “Letters of Marque and Reprisal”, he usurped Congress’ power grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 ofthe U.S. Constitution provides: [The Congress shall have Power…] to declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.

8. President Obama’s Orders in Detail

The first of the Orders, EO 13660 of 6 March 2014, proclaimed that amalgamation of Crimea into the Russian Federation constituted “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States”. This formulation utilised the IEEPA phrase, “unusual and extraordinary threat”, and asserted two of the permissible sources of threat, foreign policy and national security, declaring that purported threat amounted to a “national emergency”.

The Order blocked “Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine” by providing, at s1(a), that the property was “all property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person (including any foreign branch)”. The Order did not name anyone, but s1(a) provided that the Order applied to “any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State” to be “responsible for or complicit in, or to have engaged in, directly or indirectly, in conduct set out at s1(a)(i) which broadly related to the re-integration of Crimea with Russia. The Order defined “person” as an individual or “entity”, the latter being defined as “a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization”. At the Order’s broadest, s1(iv) provided that it applied to those the Administration deemed: “to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any activity described in subsection (a)(i) or (a)(ii) of this section or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order”.

The catchment of this section is demonstrated by the October 2022 arrest of British businessman Graham Bonham-Carter on U.S. charges of conspiring to violate sanctions placed on Russian Oleg Deripaska. The US prosecutor is seeking to extradite Bonham Carter, for allegedly making payments for U.S. properties owned by Deripaska and trying to move the aluminum magnate’s artwork in the United States overseas. To use the language in Cummings v. Missouri, the decision to charge Bonham-Carter was an executive “act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.” This was a complete denial of due process and a replication of the “administrative means” the Soviet regime used to carry out its reign of terror.

The Order provided that any property of a sanctioned person or entity was “blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in” and applied “notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of this order.” By “impairing the obligation of contracts” ‘this was in direct contravention of Art 1 s9, in spirit if not law. By these broad terms the Order inflicted financial punishment not only on those Russians singled out by the Administration, but on any others who had the misfortune to be engaged in financial dealing with them at the time. This was retrospective punishment, by which President Obama’s Orders contravened the most fundamental principle of a rules-based order and one constantly restated by the US Courts.

The second Order, EO 13661 of 16 March 2014, “Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine” vastly expanded the orders, as it broadened the scope of sanctions from involvement in the re-unification of Crimea to association to include any “official of the Government of the Russian Federation”, redundantly naming 7 senior officials. It also sanctioned “persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State…to operate in the arms or related materiel sector in the Russian Federation”. Casting the net as far as the “related materiel sector” entailed collective punishment.

Executive Order 13662 of March 20, 2014 sanctioned “such sectors of the Russian Federation economy as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, such as financial services, energy, metals and mining, engineering, and defense and related materiel.” This Order broadened the scope of collective punishment.

EO 13685 of 19 December 2014 prohibited new investment in Crimea by a United States person, wherever located, import and export of any “goods, services, or technology” between Crimea and the United States, by a United States person, wherever located and any “approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee” by a United States person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited by this section if performed by a United States person or within the United States. This Order further broadened the scope of collective punishment.

The Orders even prohibited the operation of s203(b)(2) IEEPA (donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of articles, such as food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve human suffering, President Obama stating that relief of human suffering would “seriously impair my ability to deal with the national emergency declared in this order”.

Penalties for breach of such orders are set out at s1705. Section 1705 allows for a civil fine of $250,000 or double the amount at issue. Criminal penalty may be a fine not more than $1,000,000, “or if a natural person, may be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both.”

9. Conclusion

President Obama’s Orders were contrary to any rules-based order as they:

1) Operated retrospectively by punishing preexisting contractual arrangements. In regard to US persons it breached the US Constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder. The Orders were not validated by exigency, as the situation in Crimea did not give rise to a US national emergency;

2) Did not set one standard which applied to all, as at worst Russia’s actions did not compare with those of the US in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya or Syria;

3) Imposed penalty on US contractors with sanctioned Russians, without fault;

4) Imposed collective liability.

In Youngtown Jackson J discussed a fundamental change in the nature of American society, speaking of:

Vast accretions of federal power, eroded from that reserved by the States, have magnified the scope of presidential activity. Subtle shifts take place in the centers of real power that do not show on the face of the Constitution.42

Looking back, Jackson J concluded that the Founding Fathers understood the dangers of unbridled power, as follows:

42Op cit 653.
43Ibid 650.  

They knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that they suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies.43

But looking forward Jackson J was not optimistic and wrote:

No penance would ever expiate the sin against free government of holding that a President can escape control of executive powers by law through assuming his military role.44

Of the US Constitution and the rule of law Jackson J wrote: “Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.”45

Sadly, the Court failed to make a stand, as shown by Dames & Moore v. Regan and Global Relief Foundation. Neither did Congress. To prevent President Trump from altering President Obama’s Executive Orders, Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act 2017 which legislated Obama’s Executive Orders and passed the House 419-3 and the Senate 98-2, a veto roof majority. The collapse of the separation of powers within the US, as regards to foreign policy, has resulted in unbridled executive discretion and the law of the jungle being touted as a rules-based order. In Liversedge v Anderson (1942)46 the House of Lords considered the scope of the Home Secretary’s discretion in time of war and whether or not it was confined by reasonableness criteria, expressly inserted into the relevant legislation. Lord Atkin was the sole dissenter. The most controversial aspect of his opinion was his allusion to Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass47as follows:

When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone,“it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less.”“The question is,” said Alice,“whether you can make words mean so many different things.”“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty,“which is to be master—thats all.”48

44Ibid 646. 45Ibid 655.
46Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 47https://www.gutenberg.org/files/12/12-h/12-h.htm.
48Ibid 244-245.  

Jackson J. Op cit 248.

Justice Murphy (1981). Op cit 240.

References

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952). 343 U.S. 579.Chase CJ in Calder

v. Bull (1798). 3 U.S. 386.

Cummings v. Missouri (1867). 71 US 277 – Supreme Court.

Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981). 453 U.S. 654, 669.

Drehman v. Stifle (1869). 75 U.S. 8 Wall. 595 595.

Ex parte Merryman (1861).

Fletcher v. Peck (1810). 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87.

Global Relief Foundation Inc v O’Neill (2002). 207 F Supp 2d 779 (ND Ill 2002).

Hirabayashi v. United States (1943). 320 U.S. 81.

Korematsu v. United States (1944). 323 U.S. 214.

Liversedge v Anderson (1942). AC 206.

The Foreign Affairs Power: The Dames & (and) Moore Case (1982). Cleveland State Law Review Volume 31 Issue 1 Article.

Trump v Hawaii (2018). 878 F. 3d 662.

United States v. Brown (1965). 381 U.S. 437.

REGINA v DUDLEY & STEPHENS

ANATOMY OF A SHOW TRIAL

At the centre of Dudley & Stephens is the defence of necessity and its place in a criminal law built on volitional conduct. At Roman law the defence arose first from the facts but was then contingent on the drawing of lots. This second feature did not find favour with St Thomas Aquinas, who deleted it when he wrote the defence of necessity into Church law. From Church law the defence passed into common law, again sans lot, but it was anomalous in regard to kindred defences, in that it was absolute. The English Court in Dudley & Stephens was right to have seen this anomaly as being in need of correction but instead of correcting this in a practical manner, and manipulated the case so that a pronouncement of Victorian morality could be made. This was a prime example of Arnold’s observation that: “in the public trial we find the government speaking ex cathedra”.

CONTENTS

1          Introduction

2          The Transition of the Defence of Necessity from Roman to

Common Law

3          US v Holmes

4          Dudley & Stephens: The Customary Law Context

5          Dudley & Stephens: The Facts

6          Dudley & Stephens as a Show Trial

7          Before the Exeter Assize Court

8          Before the Queen’s Bench

9          The Reasons of the Court

10        The Great Example

11        Conclusion

1. Introduction

Dudley & Stephens is the quintessential criminal case in the common law pantheon because at its centre is the question of what constitutes volitional behaviour. In Dudley & Stephens volitional behaviour is pitched against necessity and the contest between these factors have generated an enormous amount of legal writing, as exampled above. Having been such a focus of attention for so long, it might be wondered what further could be said about this case.

The research approach in this paper is to track the historical articulation of the defence of necessity and to demonstrate how its truncation, by the deletion of the use of the lot, created an anomaly in English law. The methodology adopted here is to address the following issues in order to demonstrate the thesis that the original defence, which utilised selection by lot, was a valid rule in extremis, as found in US v Holmes but that without the lot, the law is reduced to impractical demands, as it was in Dudley & Stephens. It is also argued that Dudley & Stephens was in essence a political show trial, which upheld the moral order of Victorian England:

1) That the defence of necessity had been initially subject to the drawing of lots, in Roman law and perhaps previously. When St Thomas Aquinas incorporated this defence into canon law he dropped the drawing of lots as an element of the defence, arguably because he saw it as an appeal to fate and so was un-Godly. The defence then passed into common law, sans lot, but it was an anomaly and the Court in Dudley v Stephens was correct to see it as so.

2) In US v Holmes it had been held that the drawing of lots was appropriate in extremis. The English Court, an aristocratic body, could not abide anything so democratic as the lot and saw Dudley & Stephens as an opportunity to refute the reasoning in US v Holmes.

3) One of the central features of Dudley & Stephens was the “special verdict”, by which the jury abrogated their duty to give a verdict and the Court usurped this function. Similarly, the Judgment is one of the final touches in the English aristocracy’s obliteration of the commoner’s control of customary law. The vehicle for the destruction of customary law was legislation by Parliament. Parliament had been an institution almost entirely under aristocratic control but by the time of Dudley & Stephens and the growth of suffrage, the certainty of this power base was in question. In Dudley & Stephens the English lords were pitching for ideological control sanctioned by a legal system which was firmly in their control. As such Dudley & Stephens is not in essence a criminal case, it is a political case and a show trial at that.

2. The Transition of the Defence of Necessity from Roman to
Common Law

The conflict in criminal law between wilfulness and compulsion has long taxed legal thinkers. The Plank dilemma, that is the moral dilemma of two drowning men struggling over a plank that will only support one of them, is ascribed to various philosophers around the second century B.C, including the Greek, Carneades of Cyrene. Another supposed source, the Roman Stoic Hecaton, though that the solution was to draw lots. Fate was then the arbiter and the right was with whom fate favoured. In Roman law the defence of necessity was treated “casuistically” or case by case (Ghanayam, 2006). If this is correct then clearly the defence was available to the Roman jurists. Within classical Roman society hard choices, such as who would pay the price in a decimation, were typically decided by lot. In myth the three brothers, Zeus, Poseidon and Hades cast lots to see which kingdom they would have, the sky, the sea or the underworld.

St. Thomas Aquinas, one of whose great projects was the incorporation of Roman law into Church law, adopted the defence into Church law as a special case saying that “necessity knows no law”. Aquinas was first a Churchman, for whom the interrelationship between free will and Providence was central. Accordingly, he was uncomfortable with the pagan element of the casting of lots, as the core mechanism in the Roman defence of necessity and so expunged it. In Aquinas’ cosmos Providence does not share the stage with the three sisters and so he could not admit the jurisdiction of the fates and the validity of the casting of lots. This meant that the defence passed into Canon law bereft of its central and validating element, the casting of lots.

Aquinas’s approach also found favour with influential casuists such Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf who extended the defence of necessity, for conservation of life, to the justification of larceny in the circumstance of starvation.

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in his The Elements of the Common Lawes of England also known as his Maxims of the Law includes a three- fold defence of necessity, “conservation of life”, “necessity of obedience” and “necessity of the act of God or of a stranger”. As an example of conservation of life, Bacon refers explicitly to the plank dilemma and it is Aquinas’s necessity, without the Roman lot, that Bacon is referencing, stating that it “is neither se defendendo nor by misadventure, but justifiable”2. Bacon further said that “the chargeth no man with default where the act is compulsorie, … [and that] … such necessity carrieth a priviledge in it selfe”3.

Bacon’s proposition is that the law does not apply where there is“so great a perturbation of the judgement and reason as in presumption of law man’s nature cannot overcome”. In particular when Bacon says the action is justified and “carrieth a priviledge in it selfe”, he placed it above self-defence and negligent misadventure, both of which, at the time, operated as mere excuse and an excuse that was outside the law, vesting only in a royal pardon4. This created an anomaly. It also runs into the difficulty that the presumption of volition is a founding premise of English criminal law, which sets the scope of enquiry within the judicial system, at a practical and pragmatic level.

Matthew Hale (1609-1676) in his Pleas of the Crown took a different approach to Bacon as he saw self-defence as legitimate necessity, stating that “the law permits him in his own defence to kill the assailant, for by the violence of the assault, and the offence committed upon him by the assailant himself, the law of nature, and necessity, hath made him his own protector”5. However he balked at the priority of the defence of necessity stating that even if the only escape from peril of death is to kill an innocent this is still murder. Hale also refuted the casuists Grotius and Pufendorf’s extension of the necessity of conservation of life, to the justification of theft in the circumstance of starvation, as discussed below, but nowhere did Hale directly discuss the plank dilemma.

William Blackstone (1723-1780), in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, set out his views on wilfulness and compulsion as follows:

[a]s punishments are only inflicted for the abuse of free will, which God has given to man, it is just that a man should be excused for those acts which are done through unavoidable force of compulsion … [and]

Choice between two evils … when a man has a choice of two evils set before him and chooses the less pernicious one. He rejects the greater evil set before him and chooses the less pernicious one6.

When addressing the Plank dilemma Blackstone adopted Bacon’s defence of necessity but attempted to reconcile it with Hales’ position, by basing the defence of necessity on self-defence, saying:

2The Elements of the Common Lawes of England. 3Ibid. 4Finkelstein. Two Men and a Plank, Legal Theory 7 (2001) 279-306. 280 Note 5. 5Hale The History of the Pleas of the Crown Vol. 1. p51. 6Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England, 186. 7Ibid.

… since their both remaining on the same weak plank is a mutual, though innocent, attempt upon, and an endangerment of, each other’s life7.

Blackstone was a great jurist but it is difficult to see how the passive act of clinging to a plank can constitute any attempt upon another, known to criminal law. To advance such a proposition takes us beyond the province of criminal law and into the sphere of morality. The result of this line of reasoning in the common law was to create a “state of nature” exception to the law which was anomalous and a legal terra nullius.

Despite this being the common position in England, the Roman defence of necessity, as it pertained to its core dilemma, that of the Plank or like watery tribulations, arguably continued to apply in regard to the facts in Dudley & Stephens. In AWB Simpson’s in depth study of Dudley & Stephens, Cannibalism and the Common Law Simpson sets out what he describes as the “only sustained technical criticism”8, of the case. This, Simpson says was Sir G S Baker’s argument that jurisdiction over acts on the high sea were originally held by the Courts of Admiralty “which applied not the common law of England but a body of law of international character based upon Roman law or ‘civil’ law as it is technically called”9. While the Courts of Admiralty no longer existed, “Baker argued that this transfer of jurisdiction did not alter the fact that the appropriate law to be applied was civil not common law”10. Sir G S Baker said that Chief Justice Mansfield had explicitly ruled in R v Depardo (1807)11 that the Admiralty applied civil law and maritime customs. Baker argued that: “the practice … of casting lots … maybe …, [was] one of the consuetudines marinae spoken of by Lord Mansfield”12.

8Simpson 1986: p. 248. 9Ibid 249. 10Ibid. 11Taunton, 26. [1]2Op cit. [1]3Op cit. [1]4Op cit. [1]5Dudley & Stephens 273.

Baker also drew upon Everad Otto, a commentator on Pufendorf, who said in regard to the defence of necessity, “therefore the judgement of the lot will be necessary, as in the history of Jonah”13. This reference Otto derives from the Book of Jonah (ch.1 v 7) which relates to when Jonah was travelling by sea from Joppa to Tarshish, in spite of God’s direction. God sent a storm against the ship Jonah was travelling on. The seamen drew lots to see who was responsible for the storm and the lot fell on Jonah. Baker concludes that, “Joppa being on the Syrian coast and comparatively close to Rhodes, this maritime custom might very possibly be of Rhodian origin. This, if certain, would be a very curious fact since the Rhodian sea-laws are a part of Admiralty law”14. None of these arguments were ever made or referred to in Dudley & Stephens although in stating the indictment the Court noted that the crime was “within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty”15.

3. US v Holmes

After the American ship the William Brown sank in 1841, numerous survivors were crowded aboard a lifeboat. Claiming that the boat was overloaded and in peril of capsizing, the seamen aboard jettisoned 16 male passengers. Of the seaman one Alexander Holmes was subsequently charged with manslaughter. Significantly the ship’s Mate had raised the issue of drawing lots with Holmes and others before taking to another lifeboat. Further the passenger whom Holmes was charged with killing, Francis Askin, appealed to Holmes saying “if God dont send us some help, well draw lots, and if the lot falls on me, Ill go over like a man16. Holmes’ did not accept Askin’s plea. Holmes defence was that jettisoning Askin was a necessity to keep the lifeboat afloat in the heavy seas and that as the seamen were required to man the boat, those jettisoned had to be the passengers, though it was a case of gentlemen before ladies. As a matter of fact, the Court found that not all the seamen in the boat were needed to man it.

Justice Baldwin of the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania also observed that:

When the ship is in no danger of sinking, but all sustenance is exhausted, and a sacrifice of one person is necessary to appease the hunger of others, the selection is by lot. This mode is resorted to as the fairest mode, and, in some sort, as an appeal to God, for selection of the victim.

… If time have existed to cast lots, and to select the victims, then, as we have said, sortition should be adopted. In no other than this or some like way are those having equal rights put upon an equal footing, and in no other way is it possible to guard against partiality and oppression, violence and conflict17.

In sentencing Holmes to 6 month’s imprisonment, on top of some month’s remand in custody and a fine of $20, Baldwin J. held that “the seamen, beyond the number necessary to navigate the boat, in no circumstances can claim exemption from the common lot of the passengers”18.

4. Dudley & Stephens: The Customary Law Context

[1]6Holmes 4. [1]7Ibid 14. [1]8Ibid 1. [1]9Cannibalism and the Common Law: 98. 20Ibid 118.

Britannia may have ruled the waves but it was not a one sided contest. In the year of Dudley & Stephens, 1884-85, 561 British registered vessels were lost and death (by all causes) of crew and passengers was 425919. As a subset of tragedy at sea, the deprivations of the shipwrecked and instances of cannibalism amongst survivors received particular attention by the media and the public. To the modern mind cannibalism is an almost fantastical relic of the distant past but cannibalism was far from being unknown amongst ship-wrecked English seamen in the 19th century. While in most instances the dead were consumed, in extreme circumstances it was the customary practice to draw lots to select a victim.As set out below,customary practice, while open to criticism as being self-serving, was rationalised by a pragmatism which could be described as utilitarian.

Privations after shipwreck were exacerbated by the fact that seamen were notoriously underfed. In the case of the wreck of the England, a passing ship, the Lord Melville, would not take survivors as they had no provisions themselves20. In 1807 survivors of the Nautilus ate those who died so soon after the shipwreck, that it was “quite extraordinary”21. The sinking of the Medusa in 1816, which inspired Gericault’s Rideau de laMedusa”, gave rise to cannibalism after 3 days and the jettisoning of sick survivors after 6 days. Of the 150 abandoned on a raft only 15 survived to be rescued, 15 days after the sinking22.

In 1835 the Francis Spaight capsized, leaving the survivors without food or water in a dis-masted and swamped wreck. On the sixteenth day after the capsizing the Captain decreed that lots should be drawn between the Captain decreed that lots should be drawn between the cabin boys, as their loss was less than “those who had wives and children depending on them”23. The lot was said to have fallen on one Patrick O’Brien who was killed and his blood drunk by the crew24. The Francis Spaight was referred to in Parliamentary Select Committee reports in 1836 and 1839 but no one was ever charged with the killing of Patrick O’Brien, and “the only legal proceedings to arise out of the death”25 was for the Limerick magistrates to bind the boy’s mother over to keep the peace, following complaints of harassment from the captain.

21Ibid116. 22Ibid. 23Ibid 131. 24Ibid. 25Ibid 135. 26Ibid 176-193. 27Ibid 192.

As discussed above, it was the sinking of the William Brown in 1841 and the American Court’s observations in Holmes in regard to the drawing of lots, which arguably lay behind the decision by senior figures in the English establishment to make an example of an act of cannibalism. Following the sinking of the Euxine in 1874 and an act of cannibalism on the part of survivors, not denied, an attempt was made to bring a prosecution for the murder and cannibalism in Regina v Archer and Muller26. The case foundered for a variety of reasons, one perhaps being that it coincided with Samuel Plimsoll’s campaign, in which he had just been suspended from Parliament for an outburst against Edward Bates, the owner of the Euxine. AWB Simpson, drawing an inference from the fact that it was the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for State who conveyed the decision not to proceed with a prosecution, says that the “crew of a ship owned by a prominent Conservative ship owner, himself notorious among seamen for staving his crews, had actually been reduced to eating each other … would hardly have been politically welcomed”27.

5. Dudley & Stephens: The Facts

Captain Tom Dudley, a professional sailing captain who plied the racing and cruising trade of England’s channel ports, was engaged to deliver the yacht Mignonette to Sydney, Australia. Dudley hired a crew of three, mate Edwin Stephens, seaman Edmond Brooks and cabin boy Richard Parker. Shipwrecked by a storm in the South Atlantic, the crew managed to take to the lifeboat but 2000 miles from land, with no sail, no water and only two pounds of turnips for provisions, their situation was dire. After 15 days in the open boat Dudley broached the topic of drawing lots to decide who would be sacrificed for the others, but was opposed by Brooks, who was the strongest of them all. Two days later, their strength ebbing, Dudley again raised the drawing of lots but he was again contradicted by Brooks. Dudley conferred with Stephens, stating that he believed the boy, 17-year-old Parker, was dying. Dudley related that Stephens and he had wives and families’ dependent upon them. Twenty days after being shipwrecked Dudley slew Richard Parker by bleeding him and the three survivors drank his blood and fed off his body. Later Dudley said “the lad dying before our eyes, the longing for his blood came upon us”28. They were rescued four days later by a passing ship.

When landed at Falmouth Harbour Dudley made a full and frank statement of the events to the Board of Trade, as required by the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 and an amending Act of 1876. Subsequently interviewed by Sergeant Laverty of the Harbour Police, who had heard of the death of Parker, Dudley freely admitted that he had killed Parker and surrendered the pocket knife with which he had killed and bled the boy, although he asked for its return as a memento of the fateful voyage. Initially public opinion was against the surviving crew on account of the failure to apply the customary practice of drawing lots. When the full story became known, including Dudley’s attempts to cast lots, public opinion in the maritime port swung over “entirely on the side of Dudley and his men”29. There was not a lot of support for a prosecution and the governing body, the Board of Trade, “telegraphed that no action should be taken”30. However, on the orders of the Home Secretary, the Registrar General of Shipping requested that the Treasury solicitors charge the survivors with the murder of Richard Parker.

6. Dudley & Stephens as a Show Trial

Show trials are managed events and so are run from the top. In Dudley & Stephens whereas the governing body was the Board of Trade it was the Home Secretary who determined that charges would be laid31. Once the charges had been laid before the Falmouth magistrates the Attorney-General directed the crown prosecution and set out the crown’s strategy, which was to seek a conviction for murder but for there to be clemency. Clemency was signalled at the outset by the crown not opposing bail, which was extremely unusual in a capital case, where a conviction entailed the mandatory death penalty.

28Ibid. 64. 29Ibid 84. 30Ibid 8. 31Ibid 89.

Despite having a full confession from Dudley no evidence was offered against Brooks, in order for him to be available as a prosecution witness. Brooks was then cast as the hero of the piece, despite his complicity, at least after the fact. His deposition before the Falmouth magistrates was either lost or suppressed. In show trials nothing is left to chance and individual culpability is irrelevant.

The function of show trials is to be defining and authoritative, so they must be conducted at the highest level of the Court. Here the normal process presented a problem, as capital cases were heard by a jury. This caused two difficulties. A not guilty decision was fatal as retrials were unheard of then and even if called for, the unanimity that a show trial required would be lost. A guilty finding was almost as bad, as with a guilty finding there was no binding precedent created, it would be

simply a finding on the facts, distinguishable from other fact scenarios.

There was one way of circumventing the jury making a decision and putting the issue before a superior Court, which was by the jury returning a “special verdict”.

The trial Judge selected by Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, was Baron Huddleston. Simpson claims that it was “highly probable that some careful thought was given to this appointment by the Lord Chief Justice” as Baron Huddleston “had a reputation

for getting his own way with juries”32. This view draws support from the manner in which Baron Huddleston conducted the case, which appears to have had the goal of achieving a special verdict from the outset.

7. Before the Exeter Assize Court

Presiding over the grand jury prior to hearing the facts or the defence submissions, Huddleston gave a formal ruling on the law of necessity concluding with the remark that, “I know no such law”33. Referring to US v Holmes Huddleston held that the casting of lots would “verge on the blasphemous”34 and enhanced the premeditation of the offence. Later, to the same jury convened for the criminal trial, Baron Huddleston stated:

“I shall lay down as a matter of law that there was no justification. I shall lay that down distinctly and absolutely”35.

By denying that necessity provided any justification for Dudley and Stephens’ actions, Huddleston put the jury in an invidious position, and he left them in no doubt as to what that position was saying:

If I was to direct you to give your verdict, I should have to tell you, and you would be bound to obey me, that you must return a verdict of guilty of wilful murder36.

32Ibid 198. 33Ibid 201. 34Ibid. 35Ibid 207. 36Ibid 212 per Huddleston, B. 37Leach Crown Cases 368.

As Huddleston’s stance could have appeared manifestly unfair to the jury, he told them that they could find a “special verdict” on the facts, in which case the issue would be decided by a higher Court. This was an obsolete procedure last performed 100 years previously, in Hazels Case (1785)37, but one which had not been abolished. Importantly such a step put the case before a High Court, thence establishing a binding precedent.

Thinking that they only had the choice of finding Dudley and Stephens guilty of murder, a capital offence punishable only by the death sentence, or giving a “special verdict” the jury chose the latter. Thoughtfully Huddleston had a draft of the special verdict ready for them, which they proceeded to assent to, paragraph by paragraph. The jury did however insert two observations into the verdict. First, that “Richard Parker was likely to die first”38 and secondly that “they would have died if they had not had his body to feed off”39. Huddleston transcribed the latter statement as “that if the men had not feed of the body of the boy they would probably not survived”40 (emphasis added). The jury meekly assented to this modification but it was precisely these qualifications, the juries “likely”, compounded by Huddleston’s “probably”, that Lord Chief Justice Coleridge repeated twice in his Judgment, to underscore the lack of any necessity to kill Parker.

If the case was to effect a denial of the doctrine of necessity it was essential to avoid any conclusion that anyone had to be sacrificed. This was essentially a question of fact, to be determined by the jury. If the jury concluded that in fact survival was dependant on the sacrifice of someone, any statement of the court, that as a matter of law there was no defence of necessity, would be robbed of the power of unanimity. Huddleston resolved this problem by rephrasing the issue as, “was there any necessity of taking the boy rather than drawing lots. I should think you would consider no. Thereof I propose to add this …. Assuming any necessity to kill anybody there was no greater necessity for killing the boy than any of the other three men”41. Here Huddleston deviously made out he agreed with the casting of lots but his formulation sidestepped this issue of lots and tied necessity to the selection of Parker. This tailoring of the issues to the facts did not prevent Huddleston or the Chief Justice from pronouncing broadly on the defence of necessity.

38Ibid 214. 39Ibid 40Ibid. 41Ibid 215. 42Ibid.

Huddleston’s draft also included an unsolicited plea of forgiveness on behalf of the accused. While obvious to counsel, the jury would not have known that a plea of forgiveness by the accused would effectively negate any plea of insanity. The jury did request that their compassion towards the accused be recorded, which was recorded with in a fashion that did not too obviously demonstrate the absurdity of recommending mercy to the still innocent, there having been no verdict.

Huddleston’s partisan approach was also demonstrated by his rewriting the record to fit the prosecution case. The official assented record simply described the Mignonette as a “yacht” and stated that the crew had been forced “to put into an open boat”42. When the defence raised the issue of whether the Court had jurisdiction over an open boat on the high seas Huddleston’s solution was simply to substitute “a registered English vessel”43 for “yacht” while the “open boat” became a “dinghy belonging to the said vessel”44. This was an important point as there was a real issue of jurisdiction at large.

In Arthur Collins QC, Dudley and Stephens’ defence fund had acquired the services of a most experienced advocate. However, Collins’ conduct only makes sense if he had been given very clear messages of prospective clemency from the beginning. This indication, coupled with the Court’s absolute refusal to take any cognisance of the defence of necessity, left Collins with very little room to move, if he were to act in the best interests of his clients. Tellingly Collins’ defence was marked by a number of lapses. Collins never developed an argument that the circumstances were such as would reasonably reduce the crime to one of manslaughter45. Nor did he raise the question of malice, which is central to the definition of murder. The question of temporary insanity was never put to the Court. In view of the highly irregular proceedings, a QC of Collins’ calibre arguably could have frustrated the trial on technical grounds. Forceful judges holding court can intimidate most juries but it is the role of counsel and particularly senior counsel, to match up when such pressures are being exerted. Most significantly Collins never told the jury that they could reject Huddleston’s choice of a finding of guilty or a special verdict and make their own determination. In his defence summation Collins did make an appeal to the inevitable necessity forced upon the seamen and to the absence of precedential punishment for such acts. Huddleston, irritated at this “unauthorised appeal” told the jury that they “were not at liberty to disregard his ruling”46.

It appears that Collins decided that it was in his clients’ best interests not to antagonise the crown, but to rely upon the broad hints of clemency, which could have only been agreed to at the top. It is also significant that Collins was at the time of the trial seeking official preferment and the following year he was knighted and appointed Chief Justice of Madras”47.

43Ibid. 44Ibid. 45Op cit 207. 46Ibid 212. 47Ibid 240.

Huddleston had skilfully created the occasion for a leading case, attended by the full panoply of the law, but exactly how this was to be consummated was problematic. Huddleston probably envisaged that the case would be moved to the Court of Crown Cases Reserved, by the old process of certiorari, for determination, and then return to the Assize Court for sentencing. This failed to factor the effect of the Judicature Acts of 1873, 1875 and 1881, which had greatly changed this procedure, amalgamating the formerly distinct Assize Court into the new overarching High Court of Justice. Under the new procedure cases could only be heard upon conviction by the Court of Crown Cases Reserved. The Attorney General then proposed that the Cornwall Assize Court be increased in size to three judges and be moved to London. However, this mechanism soon ran into difficulties. It was discovered that the Judicature Act of 1873 transferred jurisdiction of such cases to the Queen’s Bench Division and so finally it was resolved to have the case heard before five judges of this august body. It was however clearly stated in the Act that the divisional courts “should consist at most of two or three judges”48 this inconvenient requirement being resolutely ignored.

8. Before the Queen’s Bench

The Attorney General, for the prosecution, argued that the only justification for taking the life of another was one of self-defence and submitted that “there was no authority or precedent in favour of the claim that an innocent person could be lawfully killed by another to save the latter’s life”49. The Lord Chief Justice called upon the defence to refute this “very strong impression in our minds”50. Arthur Collins QC was told to address only the issue of murder, the issue of manslaughter being peremptorily ruled out despite the special verdict leaving manslaughter as a potential outcome.

48Ibid 223. 49Ibid 229. 50Ibid 276. 51Ibid 227. 52Leach Crown Cases 242. 53supra at note 41. 549 Co. Rep. 65b. 552 Ld. Raymond 1485. 56Simpson 227. 57Ibid 228. 58Ibid.

In his opening submissions Collins raised a key issue. The special verdict, as originally transcribed before Huddleston and as evidenced by the original verbatim transcript concluded with the words: “But whether upon the whole matter the prisoners were or are guilty of murder the Jury are ignorant and refer to the court”51. This was the formula used in Rex v Pedly52 and Rex v Hazel53 but such a formula surrendered to the judges the jury’s right to determine guilt or innocence. In the precedent cases of Rex v Mackalley54 and Rex v Oneby55 this issue had been resolved by making a verdict conditional, stated as “Whether this is murder or manslaughter the jury pray the advice of the court and find accordingly”56. Collins pointed out that the original formulation, as transcribed before Huddleston, had been removed and wording conforming to the legally correct formulation substituted, This rewriting of the record was held by the Queen’s Bench to be merely “a clerical matter”57 and was passed over. This was despite the fact that Rex v Mackalley and Rex v Oneby provided that in the absence of a conditional finding the trial proceedings were void as the jury had not performed its function, as Collins stated: “unless there was a finding the judges would give the verdict”58.

Collins’ primary submission was that the defence of necessity applied to the facts and that this defence justified or excused the killing. Collins maintained four bases for his defence of necessity:

1) that the English court should follow US v Holmes;

2) the “state of nature” thesis; that the men’s actions were not voluntary;

3) that the Utilitarian principle that actions are right if they tend towards the greatest possible happiness should be followed and that this meant that those with dependants should have priority over those that didn’t;

4) and as mitigation, that the killing should be excused because of the overwhelming pressure of circumstance.

The court took only a few moments to reject the defence stating “we are all of the opinion that the conviction should be affirmed”59. US v Holmes was rejected in principle and as not being binding on an English court. The state of nature thesis was rejected outright and Collins’ attempt to argue involuntariness foundered on the deliberate nature of the act. The Queen’s Bench could not see how Utilitarianism, given the assumption of human equality, could select who could be killed for the benefit of others. Collins was hampered by the absence of any formal selection by lot but given the Court’s antipathy to the “custom of the sea” it is doubtful if the Court’s attitude would have been any different had such selection taken place. As for mitigating circumstances the traditional view of the Court is that such factors can only mitigate punishment but in a capital case the Court could only impose the penalty of death. Questions of mercy are outside the prerogative of the court and reside with the executive. It was the Court’s view that “it is just when temptations are strongest and the difficulties of self-control most acute that the law should reinforce the individual conscience with the threat of punishment”60.

9. The Reasons of the Court

In setting out the reasons of the court, Lord Coleridge’s first referred to the special verdict, stating:

The jury returned a special verdict, the legal effect of which has been argued before us61.

59Ibid 236. 60Ibid 234. 61Dudley & Stephens para 1. 62Op cit. 228.

In fact, the special verdict was a fait accompli, the only aspect being raised by Collins was its rewording, which had been brushed of as a technicality. Mr Justice Grove, alone of the bench, was concerned about taking over the role of the jury but even he considered the matter “pure form, almost a clerical matter”62. The issue of jurisdiction returned to haunt the court once judgement had been given and particularly Justice Denman, who was unsure of the meaning of the word “Judgment” in this context. If it was a pronouncement of sentence, then where was the verdict, if it was a verdict, then Collins was correct when he claimed that the court had taken over the role of the jury.

Lord Coleridge’s first concern was to validate the jury’s abrogation of its role in succumbing to Huddleston’s pressure to seek a special verdict. He did this by describing this as an act of “cold precision”63. This was a case in which there was a full and frank confession and a prosecution eyewitness. Neither manslaughter or temporary insanity was ever put before the Jury and the one live issue, necessity, the jury equivocated over, succumbed to Huddleston’s pressure and abdicated their role. The term “precision” has no application in these circumstances and its use demonstrates that the court is parading the fiction of unanimity.

Addressing the defence of necessity Lord Justice Coleridge stated that:

[T]he real question in the case [is] whether killing under the circumstances set forth in the verdict be or not be murder. The contention that it could be anything else was, to the minds of us all, both new and strange, and we stopped the Attorney General in his negative argument in order that we might hear what could be said in support of a proposition which appeared to us to be at once dangerous, immoral, and opposed to all legal principle and analogy …

A central feature of the show trial is that it is not enough to balance competing viewpoints, the impugned approach must be treated as being unsupportable, inconceivable, almost madness. In using such an extreme phraseology as “new and strangeat once dangerous, immoral, and opposed to all legal principle and analogy” Lord Coleridge again presents a fiction, as the doctrine was neither new, nor strange to English law. Lord Coleridge and all of the august members of the Queen’s Bench were familiar with Bacon’s Maxims and knew that Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England enunciated two principles capable of supporting the doctrine of necessity, as set out above. It was a matter of record that Blackstone’s principles had been used extensively to support Dudley and Stephens by their first counsel, Harry Tilly, before the Falmouth magistrates64. The fourth report of the Criminal Law Commissioners had, in their 1839 Digest of Law (Article 39) included a defence of necessity to homicide, as had the Digest to the Seventh Report (1843) by Article 29.

In its determination the Queen’s Bench did refer to St Aquinas, Grotius and Pufendorf, and noted that “the proposition as to the plank … is said to be derived from the canonists”65 but there is no engagement with the dilemma sough to be solved by these legal thinkers. Despite the close analogy to the Plank dilemma, the Court baldly stated that “the temptation to the act which existed here is not what the law ever called necessity”66. This is plainly wrong, whether Aquinas et al were right or not, Dudley & Stephens was a paradigm “plank” situation. The Queen’s bench gave Sir Francis Bacon a pass, saying that if he “meant to lay down a broad proposition … it is certainly not law at the present day”67.

63Ibid 279. 64Op. cit. 78. 65Dudley & Stephens [8]. 66Op. cit. 286. 67Dudley & Stephens [6].

Because the drawing of lots had been deemed blasphemous by Baron Huddleston and so excised from the trial, the Queen’s Bench could then ignore the rule it provides in extremis, Lord Coleridge stating;

It is not needful to point out the awful danger of admitting the principle which has been contended for. Who is to be the judge of this sort of necessity? By what measure is the comparative value of lives to be measured? Is it to be strength, or intellect, or what?

In regard to the facts before it the Queen’s Bench held the act “… was clearly murder, unless the killing can be justified by some well recognised excuse”68, confusing the distinct legal categories of justification and excuse. Inconsistency and confusion do not trouble show trials as they are not meant to be rationally analysed but taken as absolute truth.

A signal feature of Dudley & Stephens is the lack of consideration of precedent. McGrowthers case69 a case involving the defence of compulsion in relation to a charge of treason, was not considered although arguably relevant in that Lee CJ had held:

“The only force that doth excuse, is … present fear of death; and his fear must continue all the time the party remains with the rebels”70.

Of general application but glossed over by the Queen’s Bench was Strattons

Case71, in which Lord Mansfield held:

Necessity forcing man to do an act justifies him, because no man can be guilty of a crime without the will and intent in his mind. When a man is absolutely, by natural necessity, forced, his will does not go along with the act.

Customary law was not even mentioned. Show trials are typified by the absolute denial of alternative authority, to the point of them being rendered invisible.

The Court placed its reliance on Lord Holt as set out above and as follows:

But, further still, Lord Hale in the following chapter deals with the position asserted by the casuists, and sanctioned, as he says, by Grotius and Pufendorf, that in a case of extreme necessity, either of hunger or clothing; “theft is no theft, or at least not punishable as theft, as some even of our own lawyers have asserted the same”. “But”, says Lord Hale, “I take it that here in England, that rule, at least by the laws of England, is false; and therefore, if a person, being under necessity for want of victuals or clothes, shall upon that account clandestinely and animo furandi steal another man’s goods, it is felony, and a crime by the laws of England punishable with death” (Hale, Pleas of the Crown, i. 54.).

68Ibid 7. 69How. St. Tr 391:141 70Ibid 142. 7121 How. St. Tr. (Eng.) 1046-1223. 72Ibid.

If, therefore, Lord Hale is clear—as he is—that extreme necessity of hunger does not justify larceny, what would he have said to the doctrine that it justified murder72?

This is sleight of hand. It can be seen that neither of Hales’ examples actually address the facts in Dudley & Stephens, which approximate the plank dilemma and engaged the question; should one be sacrificed for the many? Such a scenario does not figure in either of Hale’s examples and no attempt was made by the Queen’s Bench to analogise between the facts before them and those which formed the basis of Hale’s approach. Further Hales’ view in regard to stealing to live, is itself hyperbole, animos furundi means intention to steal. In addition, it is important that Hale’s comments are in regard to felony, not larceny, which is the crime Grotius and Pufendorf address. The distinction is relevant as the difference between felony and larceny is significant in the weighing of benefit/dis-benefit.

Most importantly there is a signal distinction between the facts in Dudley & Stephens and Hales example as the mens rea elements of the crimes differ, intentional conduct for felony versus malice for murder. The key here is that unlike in Holmes, were the charge was one of unlawful homicide, to unleash the awful power of the Court in a show trial; the Queen’s Bench had to be wielding a capital offence.

In the initial defence of Dudley and Stephens, before the magistrates, Tilly, the lawyer then acting, had drawn heavily on a leading Utilitarian, Sir James Stephens, one of the current Criminal Law commissioners, and author of the Commentaries on the Laws of England, which addressed the doctrine of necessity in terms of the Utilitarian “felicitous calculous”. At the time Utilitarianism was at its height and the “felicitous calculous” provided a rationale opposed to the ideology being advanced by the Queen’s Bench. Not only was this threat negated but Sir Stephens was enlisted to counter United States v Holmes, the most significant obstacle to the Queen’s Bench’s judicial authority, by Lord Coleridge, as follows:

… in which it was decided, correctly indeed, that sailors had no right to throw passengers overboard to save themselves, but on the somewhat strange ground that the proper mode of determining who was to be sacrificed was to vote upon the subject by ballot, can hardly,as my Brother Stephens says, be an authority satisfactory to a court in this country73.

73Dudley & Stephens 8. 74Op cit 248.

Despite the Queens Bench ruling running directly counter to the Utilitarian “felicitous calculous”, its foremost advocate, Sir James Stephen’s made no comment on the case. It is inconceivable that Lord Coleridge would have referred to Sir Stephens as he did without knowing that Stephens’ loyalty to the establishment meant that the Queen’s Bench could deal with the utilitarian argument without any criticism from that direction. Comfortable in having co-opted Sir Stephens, the Queen’s Bench went so far as to explicitly reject a Utilitarian approach to the issue. In his postscript to the case, Mr Justice Grove made a direct counter to the utilitarian rationale, positing the argument that if the men had not been soon rescued and had continued the process of drawing lots one would reach a point where perhaps three had died so that one might live, saying this would be the reverse of utility. Despite the obvious flaw to this reasoning, no public rejoinder was made by Sir Stephens. Simpson says that after the Judgment Sir Stephens let it be known he entirely agreed with the decision, “least any crack in the judicial fabric weaken the authority of the decision”74.

10. The Great Example

Against the pragmatism of the Court in Holmes the Queen’s Bench ultimately denied the defence of necessity on the authority of the “Great Example whom we all profess to follow”75 (emphasis added). In one foul swoop Lord Coleridge converts the entire nation, everyone with a duty to sacrifice themselves. Strangely this duty does not appear to be a well-known part of Christ’s message, as Lord Coleridge is unable to cite a single parable to support it.

As the Queen’s Bench had already purported to find legal authority in Lord Hale the higher authority of Christ was not necessary to determine the case but this was not what was happening. In a show trial the facts, or some semblance of them, are just the framework for the pronouncement of establishment ideology. This the Queen’s Bench did as follows:

… The temptation to the act which existed here was not what the law has ever called necessity. Nor is this to be regretted. Though law and morality are not the same, and many things may be immoral which are not necessarily illegal, yet the absolute divorce of law from morality would be of fatal consequence; and such divorce would follow if the temptation to murder in this case were to be held by law an absolute defence of it. It is not so. To preserve one’s life is generally speaking a duty, but it may be the plainest and the highest duty to sacrifice it. War is full of instances in which it is a man’s duty not to live, but to die. The duty, in case of shipwreck, of a captain to his crew, of the crew to the passengers, of soldiers to women and children, as in the noble case of the Birkenhead; these duties impose on men the moral necessity, not of the preservation, but of the sacrifice of their lives for others76.

Unpacking this statement, it begins with an untruth. The Dudley & Stephens situation was a paradigm “plank dilemma”. Hecaton, Roman law, Aquinas, Bacon and Blackstone rightly or wrongly argued the defence of necessity applied in these circumstances. There was no precedent for a murder conviction in Customary law and Admiralty law held no wrong had been committed in such circumstances.

The Court then makes claim that allowing the defence to operate would result in an “absolute divorce of law from morality … of fatal consequence” presumably implying consequences fatal not only to cabin boys but to society at large. This is simply theatrical hype, or did the Queen’s Bench really think that society was in danger of being dissolved in a cannibal feast? It should be noted that the operation of necessity as an absolute defence was of their own making, as there had always been the option of laying charges of manslaughter, as in Holmes.

75Ibid. 76Ibid. 77Sir Edward Coke.

The identification of law and morality in this passage is reinforced at the conclusion with the Queen’s Bench founding the duty of self- sacrifice on “moral necessity”. As such the Dudley & Stephens represents the abject surrender of the law’s great project, the “perfection of reason”77. The reason the great jurists eschewed morality in law was because morals differ whereas reason is universal. That the leading judges of their time were unable to found their decision on legal thinking was not suprising as they had cut themselves of from rationality and precedent.

The Queen’s Bench then sets out a muddle of arguments. First it claims that preserving “one’s life is generally speaking a duty” without any basis for this assertion. This claim is then contradicted by the claim that “it may be the plainest and the highest duty to sacrifice it”. This assertion is then supported by the claim that “war is full of instances in which it is a man’s duty not to live”. This overstates the fact. Certainly soldiers have a duty to put themselves in situations where they may not live, but this is not a “duty not to live”, in fact their duty is to outlive the other side. Especially hazardous roles, such as assault troops generally volunteer, as the survivors are promoted. In western culture suicide missions are invariably by volunteers.

The duty, “in case of shipwreck, of a captain to his crew”, is the flip side of the dictatorial powers of a sea captain, with power comes responsibility. Importantly this duty is co-incidental to a captain’s duty to the ship owner and underwriters. An abandoned ship is subject to salvage without negotiation.

The Queen’s Bench baldly states that a crew has a duty to passengers, without any reference to authority or precedent. In Holmes the Court stated that the crew had a duty to the passengers, as common carriers, but in extremis all had the same right bar an exception made to those needed to pilot the lifeboat.

There is no duty of soldiers to women and children, as the concept of collateral damage informs us. In the case of the Birkenhead the soldiers were ordered to stand by, it was their duty to obey orders. In any event the women and children at issue were their own wives and children, a material fact not mentioned by the Queen’s Bench.

Any doctrine based on “the great example”, which cannot muster one verse of scripture and leaps straight from the Prince of Peace to a military duty to die for King and Country is an exercise in ideological acrobatics. The religious motif is sustained throughout the Judgment with the repetitive use of the word “temptation” together with such characterisations such as unbridled passion … if not “devilish deeds”78. To use these terms as descriptors of the desperate delirium of dying men is a nonsense. Moreover, in reaching for an ideological basis for the Judgment Lord Coleridge ends up back with Bacon’s defence of necessity of obedience, insofar as he cites the Roman officer quoted in Bacon’s Maxims as saying: Necesse est ut eam, non ut vivam, which translates, “it is necessary to serve (the empire) not live”79.

78Ibid 11. 79Ibid.

As such Dudley & Stephens is an ideological amalgam of imperial dictate and orthodox theological authority. The “necessity to serve” is simply submission to overwhelming force. In Dudley & Stephens this power is manifested in the manner of the trial culminating in the death penalty.

The Judgment’s basis in orthodox theological authority surfaces at the outset with Baron Huddleston rejection of the ruling in US v Holmes, validating the casting of lots, on the basis that it “verges on the blasphemous”80. The Bible defines blasphemy in John 10:33 and Mark 2:7 as calling a mere human God or saying a man has the power to forgive sins. It can be seen there is not a great fit here. At best the casting of lots determines an outcome by chance, which can be viewed as an appeal to fate. It appears then that Huddleston is either using the term “blasphemous” as theatre or is saying that the casting of lots absolves sin, which is to conflate morality with law (It is noted that the pragmatic Justice in Holmes resolved this complex theological problem by simply equating fate with Providence, a stance which the Scholastics might quibble at but which arrives at a practical solution).

Contrary to what appears to be Huddleston’s view it is not Christ’s message that fate is the hand of God. Christ’s message is to choose salvation and as such is based on free will. Free will cannot exist in a world ordered by fate or God. A Christian prays for forgiveness, for strength of faith etc. not to change the world. Christ’s defeat of fate, by rising from the dead, stems from his act of free will, his choice to be crucified. It follows that the casting of lots, as an appeal to fate not God, would only be blasphemous if God was fate. God as fate is not the Christian God, but the jealous God of the Old Testament. It is this priestly religion, the religion of rules, that the court masquerades as Christianity.

Throughout the judgement Lord Coleridge utilises the word temptation, which is a Christian concept, but to characterise Dudley and Stephens’ action as succumbing to temptation misrepresents temptation, at least as a Christian concept. In Christian theology the classic example of temptation is Satan’s attempt to tempt Jesus. This occurs when Jesus is fasting in the desert, so there is some parallel to Dudley and Stephens’ situation, although of course there is a primary distinction in that Jesus chose to fast, Dudley and Stephens did not. Jesus could leave the desert, there was no way out in the Dudley and Stephens’ situation. Satan does not offer Jesus a donut, or perhaps more relevantly someone’s body to fed off. Jesus is offered power over the world. The point is that it is an offer unrelated to Jesus’s survival, he is fasting not starving. Jesus can and does refuse Satan’s offer, he does not chose evil. As a Christian concept temptation only exists where there is a choice, to do good or to do evil. In the Dudley & Stephens situation there is only the Blackstonian choice between two evils, them all dying or one being sacrificed, so they others may live, possibly in time to be rescued. Lord Coleridge does not use the word “temptation” with any accuracy, its use is merely as a moralistic pejorative.

80Op cit 201.

The reason the Queen’s Bench did not engage with Blackstone’s choice between evils principle, is because this was a show trial and any consideration of whether on the facts of the matter Dudley and Stephens were in the grip of the “unavoidable force of compulsion” admits of its possibility. In a show trial the very possibility of another result is denied. More fundamentally, the Queen’s Bench could not engage with Blackstone’s second principle as this brings into play the customary law of the sea.

Going back to the beginning, be that Jonah’s travels or the appalling losses at sea at the time, life for a seaman was tough. Shipwrecks were not uncommon, crews and passengers were reduced to cannibalism and in extremis lots were cast to see who would be sacrificed for the others. There was precedent in the Francis Spaight for sacrificing of those without dependants, such as cabin boys. Dudley references this at the time, saying that Stephens and he had wives and families’ dependent upon them. This is part of the calculous. The wives and children of mariners lost at sea in 1884 may no longer have starved on the streets as they would have 50 years before but their future would be in the horrors of the poor house. This was a reality that the gentlemen of the Queen’s Bench would never know. Rather than engage with such practical solutions to thorny problems on a principled basis, the Queen’s Bench misrepresented the motives at issue. This was not a case of temptation or unbridled passion. and Stephens did not indulge in an act of gluttony.

11. Conclusion

Dudley & Stephens was the leading English authority on the common law doctrine of necessity for about 100 years. As late as 1962 Brett & Waller, in their ‘Cases & Materials in Criminal Law’, described the case in these terms:

 “The jurors, being men of great sagacity found all these facts by way of a special verdict. They declined to give their view whether these facts amounted to murder and instead prayed the advice of the court (Huddleston B) being likewise a man of great sagacity; the court reserved the question for argument before a court of five judges of the Queen’s Bench division”.

Despite Brett & Waller’s heaping of sagacity upon sagacity on the Queen’s Bench, Dudley & Stephens was entirely disregarded at Nuremburg. In the Krupp Trial the Tribunal referred to the fact scenario in Holmes and cited Strattons Case in its adoption of “the Anglo-American rule” as follows:

“Necessity is a defence when it is shown that the act charged was done to avoid an evil severe and irreparable; that there was no other adequate means of escape; and that the remedy was not disproportioned to the evil”81.

81US Military Tribunal Nuremberg, Judgment of 31 July 1948 Vol. IX p 90.

It was not until George Fletchers’ Rethinking Criminal Law, published in 1984, that the thinking behind Dudley & Stephens was really questioned. This raises the issue that in Dudley & Stephens the highest Court in England had ceased to be a court that applied reason and instead had become the vehicle for proclaiming moral standards. Worse still the muddled morality of the Court was proclaimed by leading elements of the legal profession, such as Brett & Waller, to be the pinnacle of wisdom. In essence this was a collapse of one of the most fundamental pillars of the English legal system, the separation of church and state. The separation of church and state is the basis of an independent Court, as when this is so, the law is not bent towards policing moral or ideological precepts. It is then free to apply practical wisdom to the difficult legal problems that arise.

It has been argued that what fundamentally differentiates humans is that we are a rule making species. The lot provided a rule for extreme situations, which was a step above the law of the jungle. Aquinas removed the validating mechanism of the lot from the Roman defence of necessity, because it clashed with his religious beliefs but this deprived it of a principled foundation. Such was Aquinas’ authority that subsequent common law jurists, of the stature of Bacon and Blackstone, accepted his truncated version of the defence, without question. The Queen Bench’s was right to be concerned that the defence, as adopted from Aquinas, could be a “legal cloak for unbridled passion and atrocious crime” but this was a concern which arose from the Court’s denial of customary law, which retained the mechanism of the lot.

The central flaw in Dudley & Stephens arose from Baron Huddleston’s lying to the jury that as a matter of law there was no justification, when the legal authority for such a proposition was the one he was involved in contriving. This misrepresentation led to the special verdict which took from the jury its right to determine the facts. The Queen’s Bench in its critique of the utilitarian calculation asked: “[w]ho is the judge of this sort of [brute] necessity? By what measure is the comparative value of lives to be measured”82. The reason the Court has to ask itself these questions is because they had ousted the usual means by which questions of fact are answered. It is the jury, the representatives of society, who were the rightful judge

of these questions. The first question asks: when does a state of necessity exist? This is a question of fact and queries as whether on the facts there was no choice or only the Blackstonian choice of evils, not being able to be negated beyond reasonable doubt. The answer to this question is both factual and normative. That is, what were the material facts and what does society expect from its members in such a fact situation. As set out above, the Jury found that “they would have died if they had not had his [Richard Parker’s] body to feed off”. This was a finding of fact that there was a state of necessity. Into this statement Baron Huddleston interjected the word “probably”, falsifying the record.

82Ibid.

The second question relates to the choice of Richard Parker, the cabin boy. There are two factors here, firstly Dudley’s evidence that Parker would have died first and secondly the customary practice of lots being drawn between cabin boys, on the basis that they had no families to support. Here the Jury found: “Richard Parker was likely to die first”. Although much was made by the Queen’s Bench of the word “likely”, findings at law are not required to be absolute, that is an impossibly high standard. The word “likely” in context means that the prosecution could not negate the evidence, that Parker was dying and would have died first, beyond reasonable doubt. With this finding there is no need for the Queen’s Bench’s second question, as the Jury found that the selection process was based on who was “likely to die first” rather than the cabin boy option. Hard cases make bad law, properly the Court never seeks to answer a question which is not required of it.

A legal code is meant to be instructive of conduct and in the operation of defences it instructs in regard to positive action. The casting of lots provided a mechanism for resolving a dire situation. A core problem with Dudley & Stephens is that it does not provide a clear guide.

The first order of failure is that it provides two antithetical value systems, one purportedly Christian and the other martial, but gives no means of discerning which is appropriate in what circumstance. The second order of failure is that each value system has its own set of problems. Within the “Christian” value-set there is no mechanism for determining upon whom the supreme unction of sacrifice is to be bestowed upon. Do we all rush for the razor blades? What happens if two of us get there at the same time?

The martial value-set also has problems. Outside of the military ranks there is no bona fide authority for the giving and taking of such orders. Even within the military ranks there is no formal obligation for the specific sacrifice of military for civilians. As discussed above the case of the Birkenhead was a false analogy. The Queen’s Bench appeared to endorse Holmes, in that it held that in extremis there is an obligation on a Captain to the crew, which arises from the responsibility that comes with the broad powers invested in a ship’s Captain. However, transferred to a military context this runs against the norm that martial duties generally operate the other way round, inferiors owe duties to superiors. Such a position, that martial duties are owed by inferiors to superiors conforms with Lord Coleridge’s advocacy of a defence of necessity when obedience to the empire is in issue, insofar as he endorsed the Roman maxim that it is “necessary to serve, not to live”, discussed above. As noted above a necessity to serve, or the defence of following orders, was not an approach that found favour at Nuremburg.

References

Regina v Dudley & Stephens Law Reports 1884-85 Queen’s Bench Division Vol. XIV 273, Version Referred to Here Justis—ICLR Special Issue

Bacon, F. (1639). The Elements of the Common Lawes of England. London

Blackstone, W. (2002). Commentaries on the Laws of England. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Brett & Waller (1962) Cases & Materials in Criminal Law. Melbourne: Butterworths.

Ghanayam, K. (2006). Excused Necessity in Western Legal Philosophy. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 19, 31-32. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0841820900005592

Grotius, H. (1625) The Rights of War and Peace, Including the Law of Nature and of Nations. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.

Hale, M. (1765) Historia Placitorum Coronæ: The History of the Pleas of the Crown Vol. 1.

Hecaton, Moral Duties in Cicero, DE OFFICUS bk. III xxiii (Trans Walter Miller, Harvard University Press 1913, rpt 1975).

Krupp Trial US Military Tribunal Nuremberg, Judgment of 31 July 1948 Vol. IX p 90.

Pufendorf (1672) The Law of Nature and Nations. Oxford.

Simpson, A. W. B. (1986). Cannibalism and the Common Law. London: Penguin.

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part II, 1st Part, que. 96, art 6. See also II, II, que. 110 art.1.

US v Holmes (1842). 1 Wallace Junior 1, 26 Fed. Cas 360.

Bibliography

Moral Duties in Cicero Hecaton, DE OFFICUS bk. III xxiii (Trans Walter Miller, Harvard University Press 1913, rpt 1975).

Summa Theologica St. Thomas Aquinas (1485).

The Elements of the Common Lawes of England Francis Bacon (1630).

Arnold, Symbols of Government New Haven: Yale University Press 1934.

Historia Placitorum Coronæ; The History of the Pleas of the Crown, by Sir Matthew Hale, Knight, sometime Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, edited by Sollom Emlyn (London, (1736)).

Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone (2002). Commentaries on the Laws of England. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Factual background to Dudley & Stephens and customary law of the time.

Cannibalism and the Common Law AWB Simpson Penguin 1986.

Modern expositions on the defense, particularly those most influential or expressly referred to in this paper.

The Case of the Speluncean Explorers Lon L. Fuller Harvard Law Review 1949.

Rethinking Criminal Law’ George Fletcher Oxford University Press, 2000.

Two Men and a Plank C Finkelstein. Legal Theory 7 (2001) 279-306.

Excused Necessity in Western Legal Philosophy K Ghanayam 19 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 31 2006.

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

4 WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTERVIEW OF; RALPH S. BARIC, Ph.D.

MONDAY, JANUARY 22, 2024

Overview

Dr Baric makes a lot of sense in regard to risk and is obviously an extremely capable man. Unlike Dr Daszak he knows what a conflict of interest is. That said the following issues arise from his testimony:

  1. He takes a number of positions in regard the question of whether Covid 19 had a natural, lab escape or lab engineered origin;
  2. His methodology for attribution to a natural origin appears flawed;
  3. His reasons that the furin cleavage is natural, are unconvincing.
  4. He made the incredible claim he could engineer Covid 19 by “shotgun mutagenesis” and selection.

This is a free-standing analysis and I have read nothing else put before the Committee. However, I was very surprised that no questions were put to Dr Baric in regard to a core issue: who among the leading scientists took what positions in regard to origins. This is particularly so as the clash between factions was venomous and it is unclear who was the source of exampled animosity. It appears it was Dr Garry who attributed comments, which labeled his concern of there being a lab origin as “ludicrous crackpot theories”, to Dr Baric, who in turn denied it. Moreover, there is conflicting testimony over whether Dr Baric was even at the crucial February 1st of 2020 Red Dawn teleconference.

This contradictory testimony around the crucial teleconference is central to the claim of unanimity of scientific opinion expressed in the notorious “Proximal Origin” paper.

natural, lab escape or lab engineered origin

Early in his testimony Dr Baric stated:

1786 about earlier, just on the frequency and the exposure level

1787 in nature versus lab, it’s massively — what’s that called,

1788 massive — the scales are massively weighted to natural

1789 origins, yes, sorry

He later stated:

3064 A I signed a paper that said that that

3065 was — that a laboratory scenario needed to be carefully

3066 evaluated. I think that says it all as well.

And in conclusion he stated:

… have things in our box that we can rapidly

5268 implement in the population to protect them, should either

5269 one emerge from nature or by some sort ‘of nefarious purpose.”

The question arises as to why Dr Baric is now concerned about a future “nefarious purpose” but in ardently affirming the natural origin theory completely discounted one in regard to Covid 19.

scales are massively weighted to natural origins the data screams

In support of this position Dr Baric stated that if one takes the number of bat exposures, multiplied by the years between SARS1 & 2 which is then factored by the diversity of viruses in nature, as follows:

1523 The recent data with coronaviruses, for

1524 example, that was published in Southeast Asia argues that

1525 there’s somewhere between 50 to 60,000 exposures where people

1526 working with bats come in contact with bat coronaviruses.

While Dr Baric may be implying this, there is no clear correlation between “published in Southeast Asia’ and the catchment area of the Wuhan wet market. Similarly, no clear correlation between “people working with bats” and the number of those who could have transmitted Covid 19 from bat collection to bat buyers.

1531 So 2002, SARS emerged; 2019, SARS2 emerged. That’s 17 years

times 50,000 exposures a year, it’s actually a little higher.

So about a million exposures between human disease outbreaks.

17 x 50k is 850k not 1m. More importantly Dr Baric gives no reason for this timeframe. Sars did not derive from bats. While I imagine viruses may ‘compete’ or provide cross immunity, this is not relevant to outbreaks. I may be missing something, but cannot see any basis for this metric. It also raises the question as to why transmission from bat to man took so long. It can be accounted for by evolution of the virus in bats, but that introduces a variable that makes any statistical analysis Dr Baric relies on pure guesswork.

1538 And so when you get to origins, for example, and you ask the

question, what’s more likely, is it a lab leak or is it

natural processes? You’re looking at one in a million, a

million exposures occurring over 17 years versus what happens

in a laboratory setting. No chance it’s even close. And the

diversity in nature, hundreds of millions of times more

diverse than what was in the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

So that gradient is huge. And if you consider that, it’s

more likely to be a natural event than it is to come out of

the laboratory. The data — that’s what the data screams.

The diversity factor only works on the presupposition Wuhan was not working on a Covid 19 precursor or worse. If Wuhan was working on a Covid 19 precursor or worse, then the chance that a naturally occurring transmissible and virulent bat virus was the origin fades into the hundreds of millions of diverse non-transmissible and non-virulent bat viruses.

the data stops screaming at Dr Baric

Despite the data’s screams, Dr Baric later took a more nuanced position

2521 is that the market was the site of amplification in late

2522 December, January. That’s still two months from the origin

2523 date, based on a molecular clock, which means it was

2524 circulating somewhere before it got there. And the question

2525 is, where was it?

2975 I gave in the BSEC

2976 meeting on January 25th or 26th. My summary of the origin of HVC022550 PAGE 121

2977 the pandemic was the following.

2978 There are three potential causes for, that pandemia. First is

2979 natural origin, second was laboratory escape, and the third

2980 was genetically engineered.

2994 wrote a piece on his origin paper in Immunology, and said

2995 that laboratory escape was possible because of safety

2996 procedures in their laboratories

3064 A I signed a paper that said that that

3065 was — that a laboratory scenario needed to be carefully

3066 evaluated. I think that says it all as well.

Proximal origin

In regard to the notorious “The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2” paper: 3023 But the first conclusion was, “our analysis clearly show that

3024 SARS-CoV-2 is not a laboratory construct or a purposefully

3025 manipulated virus.”

3026 Do you agree?HVC022550 PAGE 123′

3027 A I would agree with that statement, in terms of

3028 the data that was available at the time. That’s absolutely

3029 true. It’s still true today.

It is noticeable that Dr Baric does not use ‘proximal origins’ term “analysis” but the word “data”, as he later discussed:

3286 their interpretation of the data as it sat at the time, that

3287 there wasn’t any evidence, scientific evidence that it was

3288 engineered. It doesn’t mean that that kind of data won’t

3289 emerge in the future. It just means that, at that moment in

3290 time, there was no data to support it.

Data and analysis are different things. To say that you have analysed an issue and came to a clear conclusion, is very different to saying that there is insufficient data to draw a conclusion. As set out in Dr Baric’s testimony there was a suspicious lack of data coming from Wuhan.

Furin Cleavage issue

As set out below, Dr Baric’s refutation of the furin cleavage indicating engineering is that it could have been done much better and looks more like a natural recombination. However, this ignores the possibility that it was done this way to look like a natural recombination. His point that such a recombination “usually screws things up” doesn’t apply, as sadly this did not happen.

2782 How would you kind of refute Dr. Garry’s points there?

A The sequence, you only need to insert three

amino acids to make a furin cleavage site. Four is a

nucleotide. Four amino acids went in asymmetrically. Why

would anybody engineer that and do it that way, putting in an

extra residue which is a proline, which puts kinks in

proteins, it usually screws things up. And ultimately, that

proline changed within a few — within one or two variants.

So that didn’t make a lot of sense to me. But if you were

going to engineer it, I guess the question would be, you

don’t need to put four amino acids in, it’s easier to put

three amino acids in, in the frame. And also, you’d probably

want to put one in that was efficient. The sequence in SARS2

is not a very efficient cleavage site.

Q So Dr. Garry was just kind of wrong?

A You can make — no, I’m not saying he’s wrong.

I’m just saying that means if it went in that way, then it

was nefarious purposes to begin with, right? Because you’re

basically trying to cover up what you did.

I don’t think — I mean, when I looked at it, when it went inHVC022550 PAGE 114

i2802 asymmetrically, that was more akin to recombination for me

Engineering Covid

Later speaking engineering gave reasons why it couldn’t be done:

3320Now, I’m going to tell you why it can’t be done. The

3321 transfection efficiency of a molecular clone for

3322 coronaviruses was, at best, 5,000 cells. So that means you

3323 can quarry 5,000 genomes at a time. Four to the 1200th power

3324 is a whole lot of zeroes. I calculated it out. One

3325 researcher would require something like 500,000 years. So if

3326 you’ve got 100 researchers doing it, you could get it down toHVC022550 PAGE 135

3327 54 years. Then you have the problem of figuring out which

3328 one was going to be pathogenic in humans. So that’s just the

3329 start. So it’s not possible to actually do that with the

3330 current technology.

However, then Dr Baric made the following mike drop statement:

3331 Now, people will say, well, you can do shotgun mutagenesis

3332 across the genome, but you still have all those genomes that

3333 you have to filter through to the one that would be

3334 pathogenic in humans.

3335 How would you select them? I know how I would select them.

3336 I’m not going to tell you how I’m going to select them, but I

3337 would, because you don’t want me to answer the question on

3338 the table unless you press me. (emphasis added)

Dr Baric’s testimony was that he could make Covid 19 by “shotgun mutagenesis”.  There is no doubt that Dr Baric is a very capable scientist and from his other testimony, well beyond Chinese scientists. However, it could not be said that there were no US or European scientists of similar ability to Dr Baric. It is a possibility that the Wuhan research was passed back to Ecohealth and Covid 19 was then created at Fort Derrick.

February 1st of 2020 Red Dawn teleconference

who among the leading scientists took what positions in regard to origins

In answer to a question as to his involvement with Dr Fauci, Dr Baric stated:

327 But after January 1st, 2020, I was on a phone conference with

328 him on February 1st of 2020 that had to do with the origins.

329 I met with him in his office with several staff, high level

330 staff, both including himself and other representatives from

331 both the extramural and intramural program for NIH on, I

332 think, February 12, 2020. And I believe that’s it.

333 Oh, yes, I was also part of — we were both part of an email

334 exchange that was associated with the Red Dawn group, which

335 was basically trying to help prepare the United States to

336 respond to — to track and respond to the emerging COVID-19

337 pandemic

However, it was put to Dr Baric that he was not included in the invites:

2649 Q I want to jump ahead and talk about the

2650 February 1st, 2020 conference call you referenced when I went

2651 through the names. In the email back-and-forths, and the

2652 notes and the invites, you’re not listed anywhere,

2653 were on that conference call?

2654 A I wasn’t listed on any of the invites?

2655 Q No.

2656 A I didn’t know that.

This is very odd as Dr Baric clearly thought he was at the meeting and recounted discussion at length. However, counsel referred to Dr. Andersen’s interview as follows:

2685 A Okay •

2686 Q We asked him these questions and asked him

2687 about the call.

2688 He said, “Ralph Baric, for example, is a name that came up.

2689 We all know Ralph, Ralph is a very important coronavirus

2690 biologist, but we also know that Ralph had very close

2691 associations and collaborations with the Wuhan Institute of

2692 Virology, for example. So if this did, in fact, originate

2693 from a lab, then, of course, he would not be a person to have

2694 on a call like this.”

The conference call on 1 February 2020A was a key meeting of the ‘Red Dawn’ group which was later raised again, as follows:

3202 you weren’t on the February 1 conference call organized by

3203 Jeremy Farrar?

3204 A Since I apparently wasn’t on the email invite,

3205 there’s uncertainty in what call I was on. But certainly

3206 Dr. Fauci was there, certainly there were four evolutionary

3207 biologists there, certainly there were people like Ron

3208 Fouchier, who I think was also on the call, and several other

3209 corona virologists, so I’m pretty sure I was on that call.

Of this meeting Dr Baric stated

2675 meeting was heavily dominated by the evolutionary biologists,

2676 who were split on the origin of the virus

Dr Baric later dated

2715 … a fairly strong consensus, I think

that was building toward the end of the call, that there

wasn’t data to support engineering, that there were other

alternatives for the furin cleavage site.

But then Dr Baric stated:

2754 …there was a lot of uncertainty from the evolutionary

biologists, in terms of whether it could be lab escape or

whether it could be natural processes, because both of them,

it can pass between virus and culture, you’ll get mutations.

If you come from nature, it’s got mutations.

2777 Dr. Garry, after the call, in the notes, expressed

concern over — he called it a 13 nucleotide insertion that

was created at the site, and said I just can’t figure out how

this gets accomplished in nature, but in a lab, it would be

easy.

Dr Baric starts with a split, which becomes a “fairly strong consensus,  that there wasn’t data to support engineering” which then reverted to

“a lot of uncertainty” and “concern”. And we are not talking about lab leak, but engineering here.

Counsel for the majority raised another very curious exchange, as follows:

Dr. Andersen produced some Slack messages to us between him,

2955 Dr. Holmes, Dr. Garry, Dr. Rambaut, and then some were

2956 redacted, and we reviewed them in camera

Dr Garry said:

2969 Q “I should mention that Ralph Baric pretty much

2970 attacked me on the call with NASEM,” National Academies,

2971 “essentially calling anything related to potential lab escape

2972 ludicrous, crackpot theories. I wonder if he, himself, is

2973 worried about this, too.”

Dr Baric’s took serious issue with this, as follows:

2974 A I don’t recall this. So because of this, I’m

2975 going to at least say one thing that I gave in the BSEC

2976 meeting on January 25th or 26th.

2975 going to at least say one thing that I gave in the BSEC

2976 meeting on January 25th or 26th. My summary of the origin

2977 the pandemic was the following.

2978 There are three potential causes for, that pandemia. First is

2979 natural origin, second was laboratory escape, and the third

2980 was genetically engineered.

2981 Q And what was the date of that again?

2982 A January 25th or 26th of 2020. So I don’t know

2983 where he’s coining from. That may have been his

2984 interpretation, but I’m surprised. I’m really surprised.

2994 wrote a piece on his origin paper in Immunology, and said

2995 that laboratory escape was possible because of safety

2996 procedures in their laboratories. So it’s not consistent

2997 with what I also reported to other groups publicly on when

2998 interviewed. So I don’t believe he’s attributing that to the

2999 right person.

Counsel then appears to agree that Dr Garry was not talking about Dr Baric, as follows:

3004 messages to us, they redacted some. So there’s a big black

3005 box over them, and we requested to review them in camera.

3006 A So he’s talking to somebody else, then.

3007 Q Yes.

3008 A Okay. No, I would just say that’s

3009 inconsistent with what I’ve said publicly and privately that

3010 can be verified.

So who was Dr Garry talking about? And who was accusing their eminent colleagues of, “ludicrous, crackpot theories”. For some unknown reason counsel for the majority asked no questions in regard to this.

Conclusion

Dr Biric’s testimony was incredibly contradictory. He said he had a bad memory for names but it seems he has trouble remembering what he just said.

As a lawyer I am very puzzled as to why the majority counsel did not tease out what Dr Biric should have known about the competing views in the 1 February Red Dawn teleconference and other discussions. It is noted that there while there may be some slippage as to dates, positions would appear to be more fixed. It is bizarre that there is conflicting evidence on who derided who about “ludicrous crackpot theories”. That and if scientists were speaking of each other thus, is in stark contrast to Daszak’s “we stand together to strongly condemn conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin,” which informed the ironically anti-science “trust the science” propaganda.

Predictably counsel for the minority tried to push the line:

790 Q Sure. And taking out bioengineered, I think

1791 there’s much consensus that that is not what we’re looking at

1792 here.

It also appears that they were primed by someone very know legible in the field, as this question shows:

1389 Is there a sense that because MA15 has

1390 enhanced replication and lethality, that it has been

1391 preadapted to be pathogenic in mice, that it is unsurprising

1392 1 that by removing its spike and replacing it with the spike

1393 from another virus, say SHC014, the resulting chimera would

1394 be less pathogenic than the full length original MA15?

As can be seen in line 1391 “that” has been used ungrammatically, and “as’ should have been used. This indicates the lawyer got handed the question and did not compose it himself. When at 1491 Dr Biric asked “Is that answering your question? I’m hoping I’m answering your question. Mr. Romero. [counsel for minority] replied “I think so.”

The Russian coup no-one is talking about

In the opening phase of Russia’s humanitarian intervention in the Ukraine, the Russian military deployed columns of troops towards the cities of Kiev and Kharkov. When these columns neared the point at which the cities could be besieged or assaulted they stopped.

They then withdrew.

This manouvre was generally derided,  as showing the Russian forces to be utterly incompetent. The public was treated to endless images of Russian tanks being blown up or just breaking down on the road.

The public perception was that the Russian forces were about to fall under their own weight, the heroic Ukranians would march to gates of Moscow and the evil empire would collapse into rubble.

But this didn’t happen.       And rather than the Russian deployment being a bumbling mistake, it was actually an extremely  successful strategic gambit.

One of the strategic difficulties faced by the Russian forces was that although east of the Dneiper the population was largely Russian sympathetic, it was by no means overwhelmingly so. It is a stark reminder of the brutal age we live in, that under the Czarist and Soviet empires, Ukrainians, Russians and other ethnic groups, lived relatively peacefully, side by side.

What this interpenetration of ethnic communities meant  was that while most in the eastern regions would see the Russians as liberators, there were many who would not. So the problem arose as to how this unsympathetic group would be handled.

Looking back at the manouvre, particularly the major thrust towards Kiev, it threatened to cut off the capital, a city of 3m and seemed poised to cut the country in two. It was this move that engendered a mass movement of Ukrainians to the west, it is said some 14 M in total, with 8 million relocating to Nato countries.

It must be that the Russians accomplished one of the greatest ethnic cleansings of all time. Which was not only the least bloody by far, considering the numbers involved,  but was so sophisticated that few even noticed what they had done.

This quite suprising, as the notion that the Russians ever wanted to take these cities is patently absurd.

Holding hostile major cites is a logistical nightmare. It was for this reason the Germans never stormed Leningrad.

From Day 1 the Russians had prepared for a general war with Nato and so had committed only 200K troops to the Ukrainian theatre. This would have been a hopelessly inadequate number of troops to hold both the Donets line of engagement and a periphery around both Kiev and Kharkov,  let alone to police these cities and supply them.

While the cartoon version of the Russian military may admit such stupidity, reality does not.

There were some other benefits. The relocation of such a vast number of people, abt 1/3 of the population, collapsed the Ukrainian economy. While an additional 8 M beneficiaries may not have appeared to be a great burden for NATO, we are now seeing just how fragile the global economic order really is.

In any advance such as this, with exposed flanks, there is always going to be a tactical cost. But as the saying goes, tactics may win battles but strategy wins wars.

That this brilliant maneuver was seen as a muddling failure shows that the vast bulk of the population simply relate on an emotional basis and don’t get strategy.

The Battle for Resources

Introduction

When factoring resource availability in the first world, needs are not resource heavy. Wants are. Wants are a complicated mixture of betterment, greed, status display and social control. The major dynamic is the developed world’s transition from a Christian morality, which permitted a spiritual value system, to a materialist morality, which does not. This leads to a futile and unending search for fulfillment in material things. At the same time, this antinomy undercut Christian orthodoxy, as a societal control mechanism. This is an enormous topic, which cannot be covered here.  To avoid being lost in this complexity, this essay will limit itself to the interaction between resource allocation and social control.

Part 1 Great Expectations

On a mundane level and to look at only comparatively recent causes, post the ‘dark satanic mill’ period of industrialization, it is economy of scale which is the core driver. Economy of scale creates a positive feedback loop. More consumption permits larger economies of scale, which reduce costs and so permit more consumption.

However, economy of scale was a problem for a mercantile capitalist empire enabled by the Royal Navy and based on a comparatively small island. Although this small island had a number of important advantages in the pre-industrial and early industrialised periods, size matters. By 1900 both the US and Germany were producing more iron. It was for this reason that WWI was fought. Mercantile capitalism migrated to the US and crushed German productivity. There was a cost. Besides wars burning up resources, the working class demanded the vote in return for their sacrifice. To maintain social control, the ruling order turned to the social control dynamic inherent within economy of scale. Availability of commodities enable buy-in, that is social control by satisfaction of needs and wants. This has two facets: it provides for a broad increase in the standard of living and it provides for a hierarchy of incomes, which links gratification of expectations with identification with the ruling order. Both facets are resource heavy, but the core problem is that as material wealth is not the sole source of human satisfaction, expectations are exponential.

The roaring 20’s was the buy in. The problem was that for every willing buyer there was a more willing seller. It became a feeding frenzy which in the collapse, those most culpable benefitted the most. Out of chaos came order by regulation. The New Deal was the first major step in the West, towards a bureaucratic command society.

The boom depleted resources but so did the bust, although to a lesser scale. In creating a legion of bureaucrats, resource use was substantively untethered from productive labour. The ability to withhold productive labour, acts as a brake on resource depletion. The larger the share of income that is directed towards the non-productive, the less braking there is.

More significantly, without social control by access to material wealth, the ruling class was in danger of losing political control, which was the reason for WWII.

Not seeing Bretton Woods for the Trees

Bretton Woods is commonly seen to be the Post WWII financial ordering of the world. It was more than this. WWI and WWII had both been fought to pass succession of the British Empire to the US and incapacitate European contenders (including Russia).  To prevent the depression and radicalization which followed WWI, Bretton Woods was designed to do the following:

               convert the US war industry to production of consumer goods.

               Insure these goods were affordable by funding an Imperial army, which would enforce resource              extraction from the third world, to make up for resource depletion and increased extraction costs in the first world. Colonialism was as much about control of markets as it was extraction of wealth.       Neo-colonialism is all about resource extraction.

Conversion of the US war industry to production of consumer goods was swiftly accomplished but the second aim became problematic. It was not just the war in Poland which a “Phony War”, it was phony up until 1944. The Imperial war strategy was to keep out of harm’s way, while Germany and Russia hopefully destroyed each other. However, the Soviet Union emerged intact, weakened as a contender but still a spoiler, who could champion third world resistance. This increased the cost of enforcement and engendered other significant costs. Germany was to have been de-industrialised, but now had to be rebuilt as a Western bulwark, as was Japan in the east.

The Empire had the advantage at first, as Russia had been badly mauled. This is why the US tricked the Soviets into thinking they would not fight in Korea, when they had every intention of forcing a battle. This paid off in the short term. The Korean War ended in July 1953, in August 1953 the British, Americans and Israelis deposed the Iranian government, so as to retain control of the oil industry, without any effective opposition by the Soviets.

In the longer term, as the Soviet Union got back on its feet, it was able to increase the cost of Empire, by backing national liberation movements. The big spend was Vietnam.

The war against Vietnam was not just Imperial power projection. There is a reason why WWII battered France so badly wanted to keep Vietnam and why the British so kindly held it for them, using Japanese troops, until they could return. There was also a reason why the US ended up paying for the major part of the French war effort. The reason was rubber and the power of the Rubber Barons, the inspiration for Conrad’s ‘Heart of Darkness’. When you know who they were, it becomes clear why the US struggled so long and hard to hold onto their plantations for them. Rubber is a core resource.

It was the economic consequences of Empire’s defeat in Vietnam and the Soviets’ support of the Palestinians that gave the impetus for the 1973 oil embargo. The graph below shows that from 1950 to 1973 the price of oil was highly controlled and was slowly decreasing. Curiously for the proposed golden petro Ruble, a barrel of oil during this period was very close to the gold peg. Post 1973 oil prices fluctuate widely but are markedly higher on average. Oil is the resource which unlocks all others and is the major factor in transportation of bulk resources, which underlies the economy of neo-colonialism.

The Empire’s paying for its war in Vietnam, by printing dollars not backed by gold and the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement is well known. Underneath this was rejection, by a significant number of Americans, of material wealth by resource expropriation. The Empire had a war on two fronts and had to run the printing presses, as it knew War Bonds would not be taken up as required. It was this existential challenge to the primary mechanism of social control which was a factor in the transition of soft power to hard power. In the interregnum, both soft and hard power were deployed and this multiplied resource depletion.

Climbing Tiger Mountain

The Bretton Woods gold standard failed because the total cost, including transport and enforcement, of neo-colonialism was too high. It had to be replaced by another mechanism which maintained social control by satisfaction of material wants, until the inculcation of social mores, which would enable control by a command social structure. This short term structure was called ‘Globalism’ but it was real name was China. This mechanism was directly linked to the Petro-dollar, to mitigate the transport costs associated. There was a double whammy with these costs. Rather than resources being shipped from the third to the first world, they were now double handled, with resources first being shipped to China and thence to the first world. Post the oil embargo, prices were higher and less predictable.

China, as the new sweat shop of the world, was based on Chinese average wages being 1/27 US wages. The prospect currently espoused, of moving industry to other poorer countries, now that Chinese wages have risen to ¼ US wages, is nonsense. There is only one Middle Kingdom. While wages are important, China is unique. Besides having the largest population, it is ethnically homogenous with only two major languages, has a highly disciplined work force and strong infrastructural cohesion.  As the chart below shows, China also started from a long way back. NB Japan’s growth rate in the period shows it was the precursor ‘globalised’ nation, which British industry had been moved to.

Table 2 ECONOMIC AND POPULATION GROWTH RATES

Country Population (1968) (million)Average annual
growth rate
of population
(1961-1968) (% Per year)                  
GNP
per capita
(1968) (US dollars)
Average annual
growth rate
of GNP
per capita  (%per year)
People’s Republic of China •———                     730
India——–                524
USSR • —-                 238
United States —       201
  1.5
2.5
1.3
1.4

90
100
1,100
3,980
  0.3
1.0
5.8
3.4

Pakistan ——        123
Indonesia —–         113
Japan                       101
Brazil                        88
Nigeria                   63
Federal Republic  60
of Germany —        
    2.6 2.4
1.0
3.0
2.4 1.0


 

100
100
1,190
250
70 1,970
3.1
0.8
9.9
1.6 -0.3 3.4

The wealth effect of even low wages on a mass scale is not rocket science. Globalisation was always a stop gap measure. Worse it was a stop gap measure which rapidly increased resource depletion, as re-supply of low quality goods magnifies energy costs, both in production, waste management and transport costs. It was not a coincidence that the wheels started to come of when China and other countries refused to continue being the rubbish dumps of the world.

By 2019 Globalisation had run its course. It was no longer an economic means of maintaining social control through satisfaction of material wants, without impinging on the ruling classes dominant position. However, by this time the ruling class’s ideological grip on the majority of the population and its build-up of the police state, meant it was ready to move from soft power to hard power social control.

War Liberalism

Looked at purely as demand destruction, the Lockdowns were comparative to the Great Depression. As a method of social control, it was the first large scale imposition of a command society outside of war.  The next step was War Liberalism.

While Russia invaded the Ukraine, this was the result of a provocation as well planned as that which led to WWII. It bears some comparison. The origin of WWII lay in the forcible annexation of Danzig, a free city of Germanic stock, the separation of East Prussia by the Polish Corridor and the subordination of these territories to a harsh Polish rule.  In the Ukraine, east of the Dnieper, Cossack lands and the Novorossiya settlement of the ‘Wild Fields’ was subjected to increasingly harsh Ukrainian rule. When Adolf Hitler came to power and attempted to negotiate better conditions for the Germans in Danzig and better access to Eastern Prussia, the British ruling class told the Poles not to negotiate. When the Russian leadership attempted to negotiate better conditions for Russian speakers in Eastern Ukraine, the British ruling class told the Ukrainians not to negotiate.

In both situations the result was a world war. In the nuclear age this cannot be a hot war but all the other features are either in place or falling into place. There is already the alignment into rival camps, a world NATO which does not tolerate neutrality, not even for the Swiss. Then there was the Phony War, now we have the Proxy war. Before long it will ratchet up, the front to watch is the home front. This is because as with WWII. WWIII is being fought for the control of resources. This time it is not so much the exclusion of rivals, from the resources of the third world, but the rationing of scarcity.

Conclusion

To maintain social control in the face of the challenge of democracy, one of the primary tools utilised by the ruling class was satisfaction by material wealth, to adhere the mass of the population to the ruling order. This was resource intensive in itself but compounded by greed, it created an exponential demand on finite resources. Neo-colonialism failed to meet this demand, as the costs of enforcement and transport were higher than projected.  Globalism was only ever a quick fix, designed to buy time to lay the social control foundations necessary to marginalize opposition to a command society. Once Globalism faltered, the ruling class moved in two quick steps to secure social control, first pestilence, then war. Next will come famine. This is the way to a sustainable future, for them.

Covid 19: the Prophecy of Ivan Illich

In 1976 Ivan Illich published Medical Nemesis: the expropriation of health

I have one major issue with Illich, he leaves almost nothing to be said. The one thing I would alter is the title, to: Medical Nemesis: the expropriation of freedom

It is available on line at https://ratical.org/ratville/AoS/MedicalNemesis.pdf and elsewhere.

Here are the contents:

Introduction

 PART I. Clinical latrogenesis [Latrogenesis is medical act that harms one’s health which may result in a lawsuit, which is why vaccines are immune from suit]

The Epidemics of Modern Medicine

Doctors’ Effectiveness—an Illusion

Useless Medical Treatment

Doctor-Inflicted Injuries

Defenseless Patients

PART II. Social latrogenesis

2. The Medicalization of Life

Political Transmission of Iatrogemc Disease

Social latrogenesis

Medical Monopoly

Value-Free Cure?

The Medicalization of the Budget

The Pharmaceutical Invasion

Diagnostic Imperialism

Preventive Stigma

Terminal Ceremonies

Black Magic Patient Majorities

PART III. Cultural latrogenesis

Introduction

3. The Killing of Pain

4. The Invention and Elimination of Disease

5. Death Against Death

Death as Commodity

The Devotional Dance of the Dead

The Danse Macabre

Bourgeois Death

Clinical Death

Trade Union Claims to a Natural Death

Death Under Intensive Care

PART IV. The Politics of Health

6. Specific Counterproductivity

7. Political Countermeasures

Consumer Protection for Addicts

Equal Access to Torts

Public Controls over the Professional Mafia

The Scientific Organization—of Life Engineering for a Plastic Womb

8. The Recovery of Health

Industrialized Nemesis

From Inherited Myth to Respectful Procedure

The Right to Health

Health as a virtue

Hamid Khazi International Airport reopening soon under new management

All Aboard the Oriental Express

Turkey had signaled that it wished to remain in Afghanistan, to provide security at the Hamid Khazi International airport, ‘HKIA’ for the Ashrif Ghani regime, after the US said it was time to go. Now it seems set to, after the Taliban’s victory.

Turkey is a bell weather of the emerging Eurasian alliance. Historically a rival of Russia, it appears it was the attempted July 2016 coup and Erdogan’s belief that it was orchestrated by the Israeli’s, with the tacit backing of the US, that pushed him into the Russian orbit. Southstream, the Russia-Europe gas pipeline which was to be via Orthodox Bulgaria but was scuppered by the EU in 2015, became Turkstream in December 2016.

Patriot missiles were now of no use to Erdogan, as beyond the US being capable of switching them of, any US planes have built in counter measures to US missiles. Turkey is in the process of buying its second tranche of s400 systems and as the price of the s400’s was being booted out of the F35 program, it is clear its military think that s400 bracketing defeats stealth. They will have noticed that the Israelis have not chanced their arm with a F35 within Syria and all their attacks, since the Russians upgraded Syrian air defences, have been stand-off.

For the new Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, having the Turks and Qatari’s run HKIA makes a lot of sense. A new and revolutionary government has a lot to do. More importantly, Turkey has its ambitions. Bringing it in as a key player in the emerging regional coalition, greatly strengthens the new block and there is no doubt Moscow has given the nod.

seems to have questioned the slaughter of the faithful. This appears to have been the reason for their dramatic falling out with the House of Saud. This shift aligns with the Taliban’s apparent move away from sectarianism. More tolerant Pakistan’s role in all this is unknown, but it is probably significant. Without Pakistan, it is doubtful the Taliban could have survived. Pakistan has the second largest Muslim population in the world and importantly a Shia majority in the strategic Gilgit region. Sunni Qatar co-operates with Shia Iran on their shared gas fields and may end up being an outpost of the emerging block.

With Qatar onboard, a Dubai vs Doha rivalry also raises its head. The UAE had been running HKIA. Along with Turkey it was one of the few Muslim countries to send troops to Afghanistan and it does not have the excuse that it was part of NATO. Although Turkey committed many more troops, with a casualty rate of .35% they seem to have been kept out of much combat. We will probably never know how much, if anything, the new Emirate will give the UAE to break the contract with the old regime, but one thing is sure, saving face costs money.

There is an economic dimension, as always. The US and Europe monopolise long haul aircraft manufacture. This makes regional centres all the more important for Russia and China, with their short-haul fleets. With a population of 4 million, Kabul is a region centre, although it is rivalled by the comparative and nearby Islamabad metropolitan area.  

Despite attempts to sanction it, the Russian MC-21 was the showpiece at the 2019 MAKS air show.  Tellingly, the air show was formally opened by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. With a range of 3,730 miles, from Kabul it can reach Moscow and Beijing together with London and Jakarta, at a squeeze. It is scheduled to be certified by the end of 2121 and deliveries are planned for 2022.

Dubai International is currently the second busiest airport after Schiphol, with many passing from India and Pakistan. Its targeted 28 million passengers this year could take a hit if the faithful fly Turk or Qatari. In both Qatar and Turkey, being fidel defensor is important. Qatar is the main financial contributor to Gaza and the Flotilla sailed from Turkey. This does not go unnoticed. With a new regional Muslim block emerging, aligned with Russia and China, UAE’s treaty with Israel may cost it some business.

Finger-pointing in the “Tournament of Shadows”

Amongst the rash of finger pointing following the withdrawal of NATO+ forces from Afghanistan, there has been references to various “prescient” US intelligence analyses, the conclusions generally being drawn that the upper echelons simply ignored them. It may not be that simple.

There are fascinating aspects of the Politburo Minutes from the time of the Soviet engagement. One is the dramatic changes of opinion rapidly sweeping through the Soviet leadership. In the Minute of 17 March 1979 there is a clear consensus. Gromyko states: “under no circumstances may we lose Afghanistan.” Andropov reiterates this. Kosygin says, “All of us agree – we must not surrender Afghanistan.” They agree to provision of bread and paying more for Afghani gas. They put in place a rapid army deployment plan and send in specialist military advisors. Kosygin is to speak to the Afghan leader, Taraki and evaluate.

The next day, 18 March 1978, the meeting begins with Kosygin updating following his discussion with Taraki. The news is bleak. Afghani troops are fraternising with the insurgents in Herat and Taraki’s advice is that “If Herat falls, then it is considered that the matter is finished”. There are no troops that could be sent in and they have no tank crews. Taraki has a hair- brained idea that the Russians can send in Tadhzik tank crews in Afghan uniforms, which Kosygin shoots down as sure to be “immediately uncovered” and “broadcast to the whole world”. Kosygin then relates: “Almost without realizing it, Comrade Taraki responded that almost nobody does support the government.” Andropov then characterises the Afghan situation as not ready for socialism and says: “we can suppress a revolution in Afghanistan only with the aid of our bayonets, and for us that is entirely inadmissible. We cannot take such a risk.” Later he says… “the people do not support the government of Taraki. Would our troops really help them here? In such a situation, tanks and armoured cars can’t save anything. Gromyko completely supports Andropov, saying “our army … will be the aggressor” and will have to fight the Afghan people. He opines such a move would be against international law and would wreck détente, for little gain. Kosygin says “we cannot deploy troops, since they would be fighting…. against the people.” Brezhnev was not present at either of the above meetings but was present on 19 March 1978, when he summarized and agreed with the 18 May consensus but also with the 17 May consensus to the extent of supplying aid and preparing for contingencies.

The declassified CIA intelligence report, The Politburo and Soviet Decision-Making’, written in regard to the Brezhnev era, states that it “seeks to dispel some of the aura of mystery which traditionally shrouded Kremlin decision making”. As an overview it says:

The picture which emerges is of decision-makers who are neither infallible giants nor glorified clerks, but hard-driving, able politicians whose ambitions and diverse responsibilities tend to create cross-purposes: in short, human actors within a highly tensioned, but strong and flexible, political system”.

I am sure this is correct. However, despite the 18 March consensus, that “in such a situation, tanks and armoured cars can’t save anything” the Politburo returned to the 17 March position, that they could not “lose Afghanistan” and invaded. This is despite being fully appraised of the two core problems for them, the religious dimension and the involvement of not only local actors, Iran and Pakistan, but also the US and China. Hindsight is 20/20, but history shows that not only was the 18 March consensus correct, but that the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan was a signal factor in the collapse of the Soviet system. In regard to the collapse, Gorbachev was an attendee at these meetings, but as he was then a junior, no comments by him, if any, where recorded.  

The answer is empire and the military’s central role in empire. In the Minutes of the above Politburo meetings, Minister of Defence D F Ustinov, bearing in mind the CIA characterization of “ambitions and diverse responsibilities,” plays an adroit role. On 17 March he does not engage in the political discourse, either for or against. He advises of the perilous situation in Herat and the Afghani request for military assistance. He suggests they waive payment for arms being supplied and urges urgency. He has well laid contingency plans for rapid deployment but firmly resists the idea he should go to Afghanistan, for negotiations. On 18 March 1979, he did not contradict those who are vocal in their realisation that a war could not be won, but quietly got agreement that the army should continue with its contingency operations.

Since Stalin, control of the armed forces was always held by the Chairman of the Politburo, but Brezhnev was a very sick man by 1980 and died in mid-1982. This meant that there was no real civilian control over the army at the time the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. While the war was pitched as the defence of international socialism, in reality it was fought for military  interests, to safeguard the southern border of the USSR.

Looking at the NATO + involvement in the same terms, there are many parallels. Ostensibly, the invasion was to protect the international order and combat terror, when in fact it was to take advantage of the very strategic weakness the Soviet’s intervention had engendered in the Russian sphere.

We know, from the above Politburo Minutes, that the Soviet leadership was aware of the pitfalls well before the invasion. It could not be argued that the CIA’s characterization of the Soviet rulers could not also apply to the Western rulers. How could such “able politicians” who not only had the Soviet example, but very good intelligence, continue to stumble  down the very same track.

The answer again must be empire. The killing of the Kennedys, was not so much assassination as a coup d’état by the MIC. Since then there has not been a President who has dared to challenge this power and those who have threatened to, like Carter or Trump, only lasted one term. The driving force behind the invasion was the military and the war profiteers. As WikiLeaks recently commented, profits from the war industries increased 10 fold over the period of the Afghan occupation. It remains to be seen if “the graveyard of empires” claims this skull as well, but it not looking good for them. Rather than encircle Russia and outflank China, an Islamic heartland has been created, which links resources with Chinese industry, under the Russian military umbrella. It is looking like the wheels are falling off the “American” Century already.

Afghanistan: The shape of things to come

The invasion of Afghanistan was a core strategy of the capitalist NWO. On one level it was a part of NATO’s encirclement of Russia, which also outflanked China. On another level, it was an attack on Islamic militancy. Besides driving the Taliban from power, it was a gun in the back of Iran and was the point of pivot to the destruction of Iraq. On the home front, the “War on Terror”, which was also a kulturkampf on non-capitalist values, was the ideology underlying the liberal totalitarian war on a free society.

With its failure a lot of birds are coming home to roost.

All those 50 countries which blithely signed on to the invasion have suddenly woke up to the fact that there are on the losing side. A consequence they never thought possible when they jumped on the imperial bandwagon.

For the US, the consequence may be bankruptcy. Post 2000 its role as the world’s rent-a-cop has cost it 6.4 Trillion, of which 1 Trillion is interest alone. Ever since Vietnam, the MIC has not wanted to make its wars even less popular by increasing taxes. They paid for the war in Vietnam by printing money, but that cost them Bretton Woods. Since then they have put it on the card.

Instead of an imperial outpost, there is now an Islamic block, stretching from Pakistan, never happy about its northern regions being used as a US bombing range, up to the former Soviet regions and across to Iran. There is no doubt about the attitude of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. When Russia was weak, the NWO pried concessions out of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, it was from bases in these countries and by authorized overflights, that the invasion of Afghanistan was accomplished. Now that Russia is regaining its strength, they are returning to the fold, never happy at the slaughter of their co–religionist Palestinians or Iraqi. Russia’s stance on Syria looms large in this and it is no co-incidence that the Russian led initiatives on Syria have their forum in Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana.

Although China prefers to stay in the background, they have had their negotiations with the Taliban, whose politic abandonment of the Uighur liberation movement has dealt a blow to the NWO campaign to paint the Chinese as anti-Muslim.

Far from being in the background, Russia is taking a leading role in the recognition of the Taliban, as Afghanistan is as strategic as ever. They have been in negotiations for months and are now moving quickly. A day after Putin’s talks with Tehran, the Taliban announced a 70% reduction in taxes on Iranian fuel. To achieve stability, the Taliban need to deliver and fuel costs had doubled in the 6 months preceding their takeover. While they don’t have the money the US had, the Russians are going to make sure Afghanistan has stability, as this will weld together a political and economic alliance that can stand against the capitalist NWO.

Russia has the military might. China has the economic might. The Iranians have 10% of the world’s oil reserves. They have an oil pipeline to Kerman and a gas pipeline to the border with Turkmenistan. When these reach China the petro-dollar is dead.